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Contested Constitutional Claims in
Primary Elections
FRANCES R. HILL
On January 29, 2008, Florida held closed primaries for the Demo-
cratic and Republican Party nominees for president.' Over 1.8 million
Florida voters who had registered as Republicans voted in the Republi-
can Party primary and over 1.7 million Florida voters who had registered
as Democrats voted in the Democratic Party primary.2 In marked con-
trast to the 2000 presidential election, the votes were counted without
controversy, the winners were announced without incident, and no riots
by outraged young political operatives broke out anywhere in the state.3
This should have been the end of the story of the presidential
primaries in Florida, but it proved to be only the beginning. Florida vot-
ers who registered properly, voted lawfully, and had their votes counted
without controversy found that their rights as voters would be negated
by their lack of rights as members of their respective political parties.
The Florida primary votes would not count for determining the parties'
nominees, not because of any dysfunction in the Florida process but
because of the unresolved tension between their rights as voters and the
rights of national party managers to determine which votes count. The
Florida primary did not conform to the national parties' directives on the
timing and sequencing of presidential primaries.4 In contrast to the 2000
general election, when Florida's dysfunction imposed political burdens
on the rest of the country, the 2008 presidential primary saw national
1. Closed primaries permit only persons registered as members of a political party to vote in
that party's primary. See FLA. STAT. § 101.021 (2008).
2. For the official results of Florida's 2008 Presidential Preference Primaries, see Florida
Department of State, Division of Elections, Election Results, https://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/
resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=l/29/2008&DATAMODE= (select "US President
(Statewide)" under "Republican Primary"; then select "US President (Statewide)" under
"Democratic Primary")(last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
3. The Brooks Brothers riot of 2000 involved Republican Party staffers, many of whom have
subsequently put their participation on their resumes for other party or government positions. See,
e.g., Al Kamen, Miami 'Riot' Squad: Where Are They Now?, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2005, at A13.
4. See, e.g., Brendan Farrington, Fla. Democrats Set to Stick to Jan. 29 Vote, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 2007, at A15; Michael Luo & John M. Broder, Delegate Battle Embroil 2 States, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at Al.
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jurisprudential dysfunction impose political burdens on Florida voters'
rights as both voters and as members of political parties.
The 2008 Florida primary brought into sharp relief the collision
course of two principles of election-law jurisprudence. The first princi-
ple is the protection of voting and voters' rights, including the right to
vote, the right to have one's vote counted; and the right to have one's
vote taken into account. These principles are summarized in the concept
of one person, one vote crystallized in Baker v. Carr5 and its progeny.
The second principle is the protection of associational rights of political
parties and the exercise of those associational rights in organizing pri-
mary elections. The jurisprudence of association is one of the least
developed concepts in constitutional law. The elements of association
that have yet to be developed include whether the right of association
attaches to persons who associate or to the entities that result from this
process of association or both. The fundamental question of whether
organizations derive rights from their members or whether organizations
have rights independent of their members has never been seriously
addressed. Instead of addressing issues that would link the First Amend-
ment right of association to a right of participation in public life, the
Court has generally focused on the right of the association, not on the
rights of those who associate. The Court has crafted the concept of
expressive association to devise a constitutional predicate for nonpar-
ticipatory association that has the practical effect of consolidating the
power of organization managers at the expense of members.
The 2008 presidential primaries in Florida resulted in a head-on
collision between these two principles. Voters saw their properly cast
votes not merely diluted but negated by party managers who controlled
the party national committees. The issue was the party national commit-
tees' authority to control the scheduling of primary elections. How did
this become an issue of the parties' right of association? All of the disen-
franchised voters were registered Democrats or Republicans who voted
in the appropriate party primary.6 The voters were all members of the
parties by virtue of their registration. There was no threat to expressive
associational rights of the parties themselves. Why did the votes not
count? What rights did the national party managers claim as the basis for
negating over 3 million votes and thereby eliminating all of primary
voters from an entire state from having their votes taken into account in
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. Florida does not permit registration on election day. Indeed, registration closes before the
day of the election. FLA. STAT. § 97.055(l)(a) (2008). In the 2008 primaries there were no
concerns before or after the election about efforts to undermine party identity or disrupt party
voting.
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the selection of the two major parties' presidential candidates? 7 Why
does this still matter long after a president has been elected?
Vote negation or vote dilution by the national committees of the
political parties still matters because it was fundamentally inconsistent
with the constitutional role of voters. The sacrifice of the principle of
one person, one vote to the principle of party managers' monopoly of
political parties' associational rights was not only a violation of voters'
rights but also a violation of a fundamental element of constitutional
structure. This article argues that voters play a constitutional role
defined by the first sentence of the Constitution, which states that "[w]e
the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America."8 This language is not a metaphor.
It defines a core element of the Constitution,9 the idea that the Constitu-
tion established a government based on the consent of its citizens. The
legitimacy of the government is based on consent. Voting is the only
means of constituting the government and affirming its continuing legiti-
macy. Ratification through consent is a continuing operational reality.'°
Viewed as a matter of constitutional structure, the clash between voters'
rights and party managers' monopoly of parties' associational rights
matters because it goes to the heart of the continuing legitimacy of the
United States government.
The concept of constitutive voting is not inconsistent with the polit-
ical parties' claims to rights as associations. The issue of the nature and
extent of the associational rights of political parties is particularly impor-
tant with respect to parties' roles in primary elections. Political parties
contest general elections but they play important roles in structuring pri-
mary elections. Yet, political parties play this role in partnership with
state and local governments, and the federal government retains author-
ity to ensure the integrity of voting. Primary elections are not the private
activity of party managers. Indeed, primary elections were intended to
dilute, if not break, the control of party bosses over candidate selection.
The Court appears to have forgotten its own history in resolving the
tension between voters' rights and party rights with the result that it has
now embraced a narrow concept of voters' rights and an expansive and
7. This article does not address what made the national party managers think that any of this
was a good idea politically or what made them persist in this course of action even if they were
not persuaded that this was a good idea in political terms. It also avoids any discussion of the
campaign strategies and tactics of the leading candidates.
8. U.S. CONST. pmbl. See also AKtL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
471 (2005) (analyzing the preamble as the Founders' foundation and devoting the first chapter of
the book to the significance of the preamble).
9. Frances R. Hill, Putting Voters First: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Citizen
Sovereignty in Federal Election Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 155 (2006).
10. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 5-1I.
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potentially unbounded concept of party managers' rights. This article
argues that constitutive voting in primary elections depends on par-
ticipatory association as the core principle of political party associational
rights. Vote negation and vote dilution in Florida in the 2008 primaries
undermined constitutive voting and violated the associational rights of
party members.
This article explores the clash between voters' rights and party
managers' associational claims as an issue of constitutional structure. It
will both distinguish the facts in Florida in the 2008 primaries from the
case law in this area and use the questions raised by the effort to under-
stand the Florida case to raise broader questions about the associational
rights of parties, party managers, party members, and voters. The article
begins with a brief chronology of events that made Florida controversial
in 2008. Part II examines voting as an element of constitutional structure
as well as an individual right and suggests a concept of constitutive vot-
ing. Part III considers whether primary elections are elections or whether
they are private-association preference-ordering processes that do not
implicate constitutive voting and thus are not subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Part IV examines political parties' claims that they are either
private associations or expressive associations or both. Separately or
together these claims have the practical effect of consolidating manag-
ers' control of political parties and of primary elections at the expense of
voters and ordinary party members. Part V examines the tension
between the concept of constitutive voting and parties' association
claims in the Florida primary. It shows how the jurisprudence of associa-
tional rights as managerial control sustained vote negation or dilution
and, in the process, undermined voting as an element of constitutional
structure. The article concludes with suggestions for resolving these ten-
sions by developing a more central and robust concept of constitutive
voting and a new concept of participatory association based on the prin-
ciple of consent at the heart of the Constitution.
I. THE PATH TO VOTE NEGATION: FRONTLOADING
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES
The controversy over Florida began with Iowa and New Hamp-
shire, as everything relating to presidential primaries always begins.'I In
11. There is no reason for this that appears to be constitutionally compelling. Iowa does
derive substantial revenue from the presence of the campaigns and the national press. Being first
means that the campaigns and the press spend more time in Iowa than in any other state. For a
discussion on how Iowa politicians and civic boosters "have figured out how to turn their first-in-
the nation caucus status into a money-raising device and a tool for economic development," see
Leslie Wayne, Iowa Turns its Presidential Caucuses into a Cash Cow, and Milks Furiously, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2000, at A 16.
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August 2006 the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") enacted
bylaws providing that Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and
Nevada were the only states permitted to hold primaries or caucuses
before February 5, 2008.12 The DNC offered no reason for this decision.
On May 3, 2007, the Florida legislature passed House Bill 537 setting
January 29, 2008, as the date of the state presidential primaries for both
parties.13 From May through August 2007 Florida and the DNC engaged
in a process seeking accommodation but failed. 4 In mid-August 2007
Michigan set the date of its presidential primary for January 15, 2008.15
The Florida legislature determined the date of the state's presiden-
tial primary, which was held on the same day for all political parties. 6
The national committees of the two major parties had issued directives
inconsistent with the date set by the state legislature. Florida voters were
presented with a choice of not participating in the primary in deference
to the position of the two parties or of participating because they would
have no other opportunity to influence their party's choice of a presiden-
tial candidate. There is no way to determine whether or to what extent
the positions of the parties' national committees suppressed voting turn-
out. The focus here is on what rights those Florida voters who opted for
participation could reasonably expect under the United States Constitu-
tion. How are the rights of Florida primary voters balanced against the
rights of their parties' national committees?
II. VOTING AND ELECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
ELEMENTS OF A CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIVE VOTING
What is voting and why does it matter? Does the Constitution pro-
tect the right to vote and, if so, on what grounds, in what circumstances,
and to what extent? This section of the article explores a concept of
constitutive voting. The concept of constitutive voting is derived from
the principle that the Constitution locates the basis of government
12. DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES FOR THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTION 12 (2006), http://a9.g.akamai.net/7/9/8082/vOOlI/democraticI.downloan.
akamai.con/8082/pdfs/2008delegateselectionrules.pdf.
13. The bill number was the same as George W. Bush's margin of victory in the 2000 general
election. See Karen L. Thurman, Congresswoman, Party Statement on Primary Situation, http:I/
www.fladems.com/content/w/party statementon-primary-situation (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
14. See Adam Nagoumey, Democrats take a Tough Line on Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, at A 18.
15. This article does not focus on the Michigan primary because the particular facts of the
primary in that state meant that few voters in fact participated. Their votes were discouraged and
suppressed, while the votes in Florida were negated and discounted. There may have been some
vote suppression in Florida as well, but the turnout figures do not suggest that this was a major
factor.
16. H.R. 537, 109th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007).
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authority in consent. The first sentence of the Constitution provides that
"[w]e the People of the United States ...do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America."' 17 The United States
Constitution was the first such governing document to be ratified by the
people. 8 It is difficult to sustain the idea that initial ratification was the
last opportunity for consent. Both the initial ratification and the process
of continuing consent are expressed through voting. Voting is not simply
a choice among candidates. It is first and foremost the foundational
structural element of the Constitution. It is the basis of legitimate gov-
ernment authority.
Viewed in this light, it is no accident that controversies over voting
and the rights of voters emerge in historical periods in which the legiti-
macy of government authority is questioned and when consent
expressed through voting is understood as the basis of legitimacy. I9 This
section of the article considers voting jurisprudence in three such eras-
the post-Civil War cases addressing voter intimidations and exclusion
through fraud and violence against former slaves seeking to vote, the
White Primary cases addressing exclusion of African-American voters
through discriminatory state statutes and political party rules extending
into the twentieth century, and the protection of voter equality and
defenses against vote dilution in the later third of the twentieth century
17. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
18. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 8. This is not to say that the right to vote was available to all
of the people when the Constitution was initially ratified. For a detailed history of the contests and
controversies that marked the expansion of the right to vote, see ANDREW KEYSSAR, THE RIGmHT
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). For a
thoughtful review of Keyssar and commentary on the meaning of the ight to vote, see Richard
Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506 (2002). Briffault observes that
"[e]ven as the equal right to vote has expanded, the substantive meaning of the right to vote has
remained undeveloped and the relationship between voting and other mechanisms that shape our
political process and structure our democracy remains contested." Id. at 1527.
19. Political science in the past sixty years has largely ignored the idea of voting as the
foundation of legitimate government, in part because political scientists seemed incapable of
imagining that the United States government might not be legitimate despite the upheavals of that
era and in part because the dominant analytical framework of voting was based on psychological
profiling of voters. Relying on survey research and mathematical modeling, political scientists
sought to understand voting as a personal, individual act and to find ways of manipulation of
voters' psychological profiles. This was a significant intellectual contribution. It is not clear why
this insightful research could not have been integrated with theories of the structural significance
of voting as well as with studies of election administration. For a critique of this imbalance, see
WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS,
ix-xii (1970) (conceptual limitations of "American political science mainstream" that ignores
macro-system issues and analytical implications of the time dimension in favor of an ahistoric
psychological analysis of voting behavior). For a more recent critique by a scholar who was a
student of some of the pioneers of the use of survey research for voter profiling, see SAMUEL L.
POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
(1991) (theory of voting decisions as "low-information rationality" and what this means for
campaigns).
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and continuing to this day. Each of these eras involved a distinctive mix
of issues that can be summarized in terms of who votes, what votes are
counted, and how are votes taken into account. A democratic theory of
constitutive voting rests on ensuring that all eligible voters are able to
vote, that all the votes are counted, and that all the votes are accorded
the same salience in deciding the election.
Each of the three eras of voting jurisprudence addressed different
elements of a theory of constitutive voting in response to distinctive
challenges posed by the social, economic, cultural, and political condi-
tions of the time. Immediately after the Civil War, the issue was estab-
lishing the legitimacy of the union that had been preserved by the
military defeat of the Confederacy. The issue was who would be permit-
ted to vote and specifically whether former slaves would be permitted to
vote. This issue raised the question of the nature and scope of the federal
government's authority to protect the right to vote consistent with the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
In the second era, the era of the White Primary cases, questions of
who could vote faced a countervailing claim by political parties that they
could determine who would vote in primary elections. This claim was
based on the characterization of political parties as private associations
and the characterization of primary elections as party activities. As a
result, those seeking to undermine the constitutional rights of African
Americans argued that primary elections were not subject to federal gov-
ernment enforcement of civil rights statutes because the primaries did
not constitute state action. Assertion of this claim transformed the pro-
gressive reform represented by primary elections into a mechanism for
denying African-American voters the opportunity to have their votes
taken into account in any meaningful sense when a primary determined
the outcome of the general election. Political-party claims to control vot-
ing in the primaries made the right to vote in general elections, which
remained subject to substantial barriers, a formal right that could be rec-
onciled with the separate but equal jurisprudence based on Plessy v. Fer-
guson.2" Voting jurisprudence turned on questions of whether primaries
were elections subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and whether political parties were private associa-
tions subject to federal government regulation.
In the third era of voting jurisprudence, the era of vote equality
under Baker v. Carr, the issue was how votes were taken into account
even when all eligible voters could cast a ballot and all the ballots were
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Louisiana statute requiring equal but racially segregated railway carriages was not
unconstitutional).
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properly counted. This new constitutional claim, the claim that votes
must be taken into account equally, addressed both equality in the num-
ber of voters in legislative districts and broader issues of the significance
and salience of votes.
Positing "eras" in voting jurisprudence carries the risk of obscuring
historical complexity and the importance of the many competing juris-
prudential frameworks that shape the law in any era. The discussion here
is no exception. The claim here is not that these historical eras
culminated in a concept of constitutive voting. The immediate
post-Civil War era produced very mixed results in terms of protecting
the right to vote.2 1 While the Court ended White Primaries and the vari-
ous indirect mechanisms for excluding African-American voters, one
cannot conclude that the Court showed an unwavering commitment to
excluding Jim Crow from the voting booth. Baker v. Carr and its prog-
eny resulted in numerical equality but other forms of vote dilution
remain controversial and unaddressed.
Referring to "eras" in the law also poses the risk that these histori-
cal and jurisprudential periods are treated as self-contained periods with
little resonance in or relevance to each other or to the future. This article
illustrates the continuing precedential value of the post-Civil War cases
to the White Primary cases and the cases on vote equality and the con-
tinuing relevance of the White Primary cases to the vote equality cases.
At the same time, the controversies over the nature and role of political
parties in primaries remain at the center of contemporary jurisprudence
of political parties as private associations and expressive associations.
Much of the hostility to the White Primary cases in academic analyses
arises from unresolved controversies over the roles of political parties in
primary elections and in democratic governance. This article does not
suggest that each era resolved a particular issue or that, taken together,
the cases in these three eras resolved the important voting-rights issues.
Such a claim would certainly not be tenable in light of the controversy
surrounding the 2008 primaries in Florida. Rather, this article claims
that considering the voting jurisprudence of these three eras contribute to
an understanding of how vote negation and vote dilution happened in
Florida in 2008.
Two themes run through the voting jurisprudence of these historical
voting cases. The first is that the Court looked at voting as an element of
legitimate government. When voting rights were undermined by fraud,
violence, state statutes, or political party stratagems, a concept of voting
as both an individual right and the foundation of legitimate government
became the factor on which the Court relied in deciding in favor of pro-
21. For a discussion of post-Civil War cases, see discussion infra Part II.A.
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tecting voters' rights. The second theme is that associational claims by
political party managers has been a significant impediment to voting
considered as an individual right or as a structural element of the consti-
tutional design. These two themes collided in the 2008 presidential
primaries in Florida and could do so again.
A. Voting as Consent: Establishing the Legitimacy of the Union
After the Civil War
The Court had begun to articulate at least some elements of a con-
cept of constitutive voting in the years immediately following the Civil
War in response to electoral fraud and corruption as a means of circum-
venting the post-Civil War amendments granting citizenship, voting
rights, and equal protection to former slaves.22 This electoral fraud
included in some cases physical violence against African-American vot-
ers who were legally entitled to vote.23 In other cases the electoral fraud
included refusal to count the votes cast in precincts in which African-
Americans had voted or stuffing the ballot boxes with votes of no voters
at all.24
In the Supreme Court these cases commonly took the form of
habeas corpus petitions from state election officials or private citizens
who had been convicted of criminal acts under the post-Civil War stat-
utes enacted to address the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and other forms of
opposition to the post-Civil War amendments guaranteeing the rights of
citizens to freed slaves .25 These cases are about a range of issues, includ-
ing the standards for habeas corpus petitions, the constitutionality of the
criminal statutes under which the petitioners had been convicted, feder-
alism and the roles of the state and federal governments in elections for
22. See e.g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1875); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
23. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 544-545; see also Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 657 (physical
violence used to intimidate African-Americans against exercising their right to vote).
24. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 215 (refusal of election officials to receive and count the votes of an
African-American); see also Siebold, 100 U.S. at 377-79 (election judges convicted of stuffing
ballot boxes). For a carefully researched argument that the violence of the Reconstruction South
should be understood a "political terror" that was "a key weapon used to undermine biracial
democracy in the South" and that "any account of the attack on Reconstruction is grossly
misleading to the extent that it emphasizes race to the exclusion of majority rule, democracy, and
political freedom," see Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court:
Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments & the State Action
Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA J. CoNsT. L. 1381, 1382 (2009).
25. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 652, 654, 662 (habeas petition by private citizens); Siebold,
100 U.S. at 373-374 (habeas petition by election officials). For a list of these statutes and citations
to those that remain in the criminal law, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 675-77 (16th ed. 2007).
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members of the United States Congress, and the larger issues of racial
equality and the meaning of citizenship.
What is too often overlooked on the rare occasions that these cases
are now considered is that these cases are about elections and voting.
What is an election? Is voting simply an individual right, which would
be fundamentally important in itself, or are there larger issues of consti-
tutional structure at issue as well? Why is stuffing a ballot box, even if
done without violence to the person of any voter, subject to criminal
sanctions? What is the harm? Who is harmed? These early cases arising
in that post-Civil War resetting of the terms of citizenship, including the
eligibility to vote, became the occasion for the Court to explain why and
how voting mattered.26
In Ex parte Siebold, election judges had been convicted of interfer-
ing with federal supervisors and adding ballots to the ballot box in an
election for members of the House of Representatives from a Congres-
sional district in Baltimore, Maryland.2 7 The election judges had been
convicted under a federal statute imposing federal criminal penalties for
these acts.28 Their habeas corpus petitions rested on the claim that Con-
gress lacked the authority to enact such statutes and, therefore, their con-
victions were void.29
The Court held that Congress possessed express constitutional
authority under the "time, place, and manner" provision of Article I,
Section 4 of the Constitution, which applies to elections of members of
the United States House of Representatives. 3" The Court further held
that such elections are examples of concurrent authority of the state gov-
ernment and the federal government, and affirmed the primacy of Con-
gressional provisions in such cases.3' Because Congress has such
authority, the Court held that Congress necessarily has the authority to
enforce its regulations. 32 The Court rejected claims that Congress lacked
the authority to punish state officials, particularly when state officials
violate the laws of their own states, when federal election laws are vio-
26. As discussed infra Part H.C., the Court availed itself of the same kind of opportunity in
deciding Baker v. Carr and its progeny.
27. 100 U.S. at 377-79.
28. Id. at 379-82.
29. Id. at 374.
30. See id. at 383 (quoting Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution).
31. Id. at 386.
32. Id. at 387. The majority held: "We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the
government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official
agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This
necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the
peace to that extent." Id. at 395.
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lated.33 In the context of its discussion of concurrent federal and state
authority, the Court addressed the shared interest of the state and federal
governments in elections, stating:
It is the duty of the States to elect representatives to Congress. The
due and fair election of these representatives is of vital importance to
the United States. The government of the United States is no less
concerned in the transaction than the State government is. It certainly
is not bound to stand by as a passive spectator, when duties are vio-
lated and outrageous frauds are committed. It is directly interested in
the faithful performance, by the officers of election, of their respec-
tive duties. Those duties are owed as well to the United States as to
the State. This necessarily follows from the mixed character of the
transaction,-State and national. A violation of duty is an offence
against the United States, for which the offender is justly amenable to
that government. No official position can shelter him from this
responsibility.34
The concept of election fraud as an offense against the United
States implicates the concept of the legitimacy of the composition of the
government. It is a violation of the idea of consent at the heart of the
Constitution. This theme carried forward in the other cases addressing
election fraud in the immediate post-Civil War era.
Ex parte Yarbrough involved physical violence against a freed
slave eligible to vote.35 Again, the petitioners had been convicted under
federal statutes and filed habeas corpus petitions claiming that their con-
victions were void because the statutes exceeded the constitutional
authority of Congress. 36 The difference in this case was that the petition-
ers here were not state officials but private persons, which meant that the
Court's newly articulate state action concept reverberated through the
Court's reasoning.37
33. Id. at 387-88. It is certainly not surprising that the Court would have emphasized the
paramount authority of the federal government and the complexities of concurrent authority in our
federal system in the years immediately following the Civil War. The Court explained that in the
case of electing representatives to Congress: "The State may make regulations on the subject;
Congress may make regulations on the same subject, or may alter or add to those already made.
The paramount character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by the
State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no farther." Id. at 386.
34. Id. at 388.
35. Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884).
36. Id. at 652, 654.
37. Id. at 662. Yarbrough was decided in 1884, a year after the Court decided the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which articulated a state action limitation on Congressional
enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Curtis, supra note 24, at 1402 has
summarized this doctrine in a "state action syllogism" in the following terms:
the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibited state action; private Klansmen were not
the state; therefore the enforcement of the Amendment could not reach private
persons. By this view, the Fourteenth Amendment (and the Fifteenth) did not create
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The petitioners claimed that the statutes under which they were
convicted were not within the constitutional competence of Congress
because the Constitution contained no express authority for enacting
such statutes.38 The Court responded to this argument with an assertion
of the importance of implied authority based on the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution. 39 The
Court applied this reasoning directly to elections,40 and, in so doing,
affirmed the constitutive function of elections in the constitutional
structure:
"That a government whose essential character is republican,
whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose
most numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by
the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this
election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is
a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest
consideration.
"If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is
superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect
the elections on which its existence depends from violence and
corruption.
"If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great
natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and
insidious corruption.4"
The idea that the government's existence depends on elections is the
core of the principle of constitutive voting. The Court explained the con-
cept in greater detail when it took the position that an individual's right
to vote in fair, honest elections is not only a fundamental individual right
but also a requisite of legitimate government.4"
In responding to the petitioners' claims that Congress had no
authority to regulate their conduct because they were private persons,
not state government officials with the duty to conduct elections, the
rights. They only imposed limits on government. Since people had no rights under
these Amendments, there were no federal rights to enforce.
For an insightful analysis of the voluminous literature on state action, see Charles L. Black, Jr.,
"State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HA v. L. REv. 69 (1967)
(suggesting that the state action doctrine be consigned to an "honored retirement"). Despite
Professor Black's sensible suggestion, state-action controversies and their role in the White
Primary cases continue in controversies over the scope of government authority to regulate the
role of political parties in structuring primary elections. These issues are discussed infra Part V.
38. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 657-58.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 662.
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Court found that the government's duty to protect voters from violence
and to preserve the integrity of elections did not depend solely on this
distinction, in part because elections implicate both the rights of voters
and the legitimacy of the government. 43 The Court found that the gov-
ernment's duty
does not arise solely from the interest of the party concerned, but
from the necessity of the government itself, that its service shall be
free from the adverse influence of force and fraud practiced on its
agents, and that the votes by which its members of Congress and its
President are elected shall be the free votes of the electors, and the
officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted choice of those who
have the right to take part in that choice. 4
In rejecting the claim that the state-action requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment applied to the Fifteenth Amendment as well, the
Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment was intended to ensure that
African-Americans had the right to vote even in those states that had not
removed the words "white man" from their state constitutions in defin-
ing the right to vote.45 The Court interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment
broadly as regulating election and voting rights, reasoning:
This new constitutional right was mainly designed for citizens of
African descent. The principle, however, that the protection of the
exercise of this right is within the power of Congress, is as necessary
to the right of other citizens to vote as to the colored citizen, and to
the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected against
discrimination.46
The Court took the position that its newly articulated state-action doc-
trine did not apply to issues arising in the context of voting and the
conduct of elections, reasoning that
The reference to cases in this court in which the power of congress
under the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to
relate alone to acts done under state authority can afford petitioners
no aid in the present case. For, while it may be true that acts which
are mere invasions of private rights, which acts have no sanction in
the statutes of a state, or which are not committed by any one exercis-
ing its authority, are not within the scope of that Amendment, it is
quite a different matter when Congress undertakes to protect the citi-
zen in the exercise of rights conferred by the Constitution of the
United States essential to the healthy organization of the government
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 665. The Court did not finally hold directly that its state action concept applied to
the Fifteenth Amendment as well as to the Fourteenth Amendment until 1903, when it decided
James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
46. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 665.
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itself. ,47
The Court then made it clear that distinctions between the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment were not constitution-
ally significant when the issue was voting rights, stating unequivocally
that "it is a waste of time to seek for specific sources of the power to
pass these laws."48 The Court based its assertion on the claim that voting
is structural and constitutive.49 The Court then elaborated on this con-
cept of voting and elections as constitutive of legitimate government,
reasoning:
"It is as essential to the successful working of this government
that the great organisms of its executive and legislative branches
should be the free choice of the people as that the original form of it
should be so. In absolute governments, where the monarch is the
source of all power, it is still held to be important that the exercise of
that power shall be free from the influence of extraneous violence
and internal corruption.
"In a republican government, like ours, where political power is
reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen at
short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control these
elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source of
danger.5°
The Court concluded that if the federal government has no authority
over the conduct of elections,
if the very sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or con-
trolled by violence and outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed,
is the country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the
hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are at the
mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute
force, on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other.5 '
47. Id. at 665-66.
48. Id. at 666.
49. Id. The Court cited Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on the Constitution:
The government of the United States was created by the free voice and joint will of
the people of America for their common defense and general welfare. Its powers
apply to those great interests which relate to this country in its national capacity, and
which depend for their protection on the consolidation of the Union.
Id. (citing 1 Kent's Comm. at 201).
50. Id. The Court made it very clear that it regarded increasing inequality of wealth and the
deployment of wealth in pursuit of political power as corrosive to legitimate republican
government as violence, observing:
If the recurrence of such acts as these prisoners stand convicted of are too common
in one quarter of the country, and give omen of danger from lawless violence, the
free use of money in elections, arising from the vast growth of recent wealth in other
quarters, presents equal cause for anxiety.
Id. at 667.
51. Id. at 667.
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The Court in Ex parte Yarbrough cabined the reach of the state-action
doctrine in the context of voting rights protected under the Fifteenth
Amendment. The Court treated voting as the basis of government legiti-
macy, as the mechanism through which the government's legitimacy is
affirmed through consent of the voters. The state-action doctrine was not
permitted to undermine the foundational constitutional principle that
government must be based on consent. This reasoning articulates impor-
tant elements of a concept of constitutive voting as an operational
expression of continuing consent.
This line of cases treating voting as the basis of government legiti-
macy continued in 1915 with United States v. Mosley.52 The case
involved a criminal conspiracy to violate the voting rights of African
Americans who were eligible to vote by not counting the vote from cer-
tain precincts.53 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated that "[w]e
regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote
counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot
in a box."54
The post-Civil War cases certainly did not offer unmixed support
for African-American voting rights." Application of the judicially cre-
ated state-action doctrine to some voting-rights cases undermined Afri-
can-American voting rights. The Court held in United States v.
Cruikshank that criminal prosecution of private persons for a criminal
conspiracy to deny African Americans the right to vote could not be
maintained because there was no state action. 6 The violence at issue
was the infamous Colfax Massacre resulting in the deaths of over sixty
African-American citizens of the United States.5 The majority opinion
by Chief Justice Waite held that the United States government lacked
authority to protect the lives of African-American voters because this
was a responsibility solely of the states. Under this reasoning, the United
States government could act to enforce the rights provided in the
post-Civil War Amendments only if a state denies these rights to an
individual.58 The majority asserted that no person is a voter of the
52. 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
53. Id. at 385.
54. Id. at 386.
55. See Curtis, supra note 24 (Congress provided greater support than did the courts).
56. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
57. Curtis, supra note 24, at 1420-23. See also CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED:
THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
58. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-55. The majority reasoned:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more
than the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add any thing to
the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The equality
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United States and that the Constitution of the United States does not
give any person the right to vote. 59 The majority did admit that the Fif-
teenth Amendment "has invested the citizens of the United States with a
new constitutional right, which is exemption from discrimination in the
exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."6 The majority then took the untenable position
that "[f]rom this it appears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary
attribute of national citizenship; but that exemption from discrimination
in the exercise of that right on account of race, &c., is."'" The applica-
tion of the state-action doctrine was tied to analyses of federalism care-
fully crafted to limit the reach of the United States Constitution. Chief
Justice Waite asserted that "[t]he right to vote in the States comes from
the States; but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination
comes from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured
by the Constitution of the United States; but the lat has been."6 Under
this reasoning, African-Americans could vote only if the states permitted
them to vote, but, if the states did permit them to vote, they could not
discriminate against them on racial grounds. In effect, denial of the right
to vote by a state would not constitute discrimination and would not
constitute state action that would trigger federal enforcement authority.
Another argument in the majority opinion in Cruikshank has had a
more enduring impact on the law than did its convoluted state-action and
federalism reasoning. This was the suggestion that the Ku Klux Klan
and other private groups using violence to prevent African Americans
from voting could assert as a defense against criminal conspiracy
of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican
government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this
principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it
still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that
the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The
power of the national government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
Curtis, supra note 24, at 1402, n. 108 describes Cruikshank as "a judicial statement of the state
action syllogism."
59. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 544-56. The majority cited Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162
(1874) for the proposition that "we decided that the... United States [has] no voters of their own
creation in the States." Id. at 555. The petitioners in Minor v. Happersett were women seeking the
fight to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's narrow holding can be explained in
terms of the gender of the plaintiffs and the inability and unwillingness of the male justices to
imagine wGmen as having this right.
60. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555.
61. Id. at 555-56.
62. Id. at 556. For a critique of the Waite Court's interpretation of federalism as a central
tenet of its opposition to the post-Civil War Amendments and a comparison with the federalism
asserted by the Rehnquist Court, see Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts,
101 MICH. L. REv. 2341, 2347-89 (2003).
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charges a right of association.63 This analysis was a response to the
charges in the indictment that the defendants banded together and con-
spired. The majority held that the defendants could not be charged under
federal law with associating together because the right to associate was a
right that predated the Constitution and was a right protected by the
States as well as a right under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. This became a convoluted argument that the First Amend-
ment served only to limit the powers of the federal government while the
Fourteenth Amendment "assumes the existence of the right of the people
to assemble for lawful purposes, and protects it against encroachment by
Congress. '
The idea that the plaintiffs were being denied the right to associate
is strained at best given the facts of the case, although it is noteworthy
that the Court did not find it necessary to recount the facts. The violence
alleged in the indictment would not appear to have been a matter of
"peaceably" assembling. As a result, the majority simply rewrote the
first Amendment to exclude the word, stating that "[t]he first amend-
ment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from abridging 'the right of
the people to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.' "65 The Court then interpreted this redrafted language in
terms of a limit on federal government authority, stating that "[t]his, like
the other amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not
intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their
own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone."6 6
Because the Waite Court sought to limit the authority of the federal gov-
ernment relative to the authority of state governments, it put itself in the
untenable position of arguing that individuals must look to their state
governments for protection of their rights to assemble because the First
Amendment served only to limit the actions of the federal government
except in cases where the purpose of assembling was "connected with
the powers or the duties of the national government."67 The Waite Court
excluded claims of voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment from
the powers and duties of federal government for this purpose.6 8
Much of the Cruikshank reasoning has deservedly not survived.
Unfortunately, the suggestion that a private association can claim
unbounded rights of association has not only survived but flourished.
The doctrines of private association find a precedent in Cruikshank,
63. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551-53.




68. Id. at 552-53.
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although it is not one which courts in more recent times have been eager
to cite. Nevertheless, voters in the 2008 Florida presidential primaries
heard its echoes in the action of the national committees of the two
major parties when they negated or diluted the votes of Florida voters.
In 1903 in Giles v. Harris the Court held in a 6-3 decision that the
Fifteenth Amendment did not support claims of African-Americans
qualified to vote who had been denied the right to register to vote by the
county board of election registrars.69 Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes offered little reasoning to support this position and made no
reference to the Court's cases protecting voting rights. Justice Holmes
took the position that "[i]f the sections of the Constitution concerning
registration were illegal in their inception, it would be a new doctrine in
constitutional law that the original invalidity could be cured by an
administration which defeated their intent."70 The majority moved from
sophistry to invocation of political reality, as it saw it, when it took the
position that a judicial order would have little if any practical effect
when a "conspiracy of a State" has been alleged.7' Justice Holmes
observed:
The circuit court has no constitutional power to control its action by
any direct means. And if we leave the state out of consideration, the
court has as little practical power to deal with the people of the state
in a body .... Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that
state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff
could get from equity would be an empty form. Apart from damages
to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, as
alleged, by the people of a state and the state itself, must be given by
them or by the legislative and political department of the government
of the United States.72
What Holmes left unsaid is that the federal government would not have
enforced any such judicial order.7 3 Only a week later, the Court issued
an opinion in James v. Bowman holding that the Fifteenth Amendment
is limited to state action.74 In so holding, the Court relied on the opinion
in Cruikshank.
69. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). For insightful analyses of this case, see Richard H.
Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000); Samuel
Brenner, Note, "Airbrushed Out of the Constitutional Canon": The Evolving Understanding of
Giles v. Harris, 1903-1925, 107 Mice. L. Rev. 853 (2009).
70. Giles, 189 U.S. at 487. See also Pildes, supra note 69, at 306 describes this reasoning as
"the most legally disingenuous analysis in the pages of the U.S. Reports."
71. Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
72. Id.
73. Id. Pildes, supra note 69, at 307 concludes that "it is the very fear or recognition that any
Court order would not be supported by other branches of the national government that underlies
the Court's own self-abnegation."
74. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). Justice Holmes joined the majority.
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In his dissent in Giles v. Harris Justice Brewer took the position
that the only question in the case was whether the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction.75 Citing Ex parte Siebold and Ex parte Yarbrough, Justice
Brewer concluded that jurisdiction should "result inevitably" from these
precedents.76
The majority opinion in Giles v. Harris is justly deplored for both
its result and its reasoning. Although it is rarely discussed in election-
law scholarship,77 it serves as a stark example of the Court's uncertain
course in protecting voting rights. It is also a stark example of the
Court's tendency to remain silent on voting as a structural element of the
constitutional design in cases limiting or failing to protect voting rights.
In this case, the Court may well have been more concerned with protect-
ing itself as an institution because the justices feared adverse reaction
from the public as well as from the other branches of the federal
government.78
African-American voters were all too often left unprotected by the
federal courts just as they were left unprotected by the other branches of
the federal government. At the same time, the Court, in its better
moments, crafted precedents based on voting as a structural element of
the constitutional design. The relationship between consent and govern-
ment legitimacy was the core principle relied upon by the Court when it
did protect voting rights.
B. The White Primary Cases: Progressive Reform Confronts
Jim Crow
The White Primary Cases developed amidst multiple paradoxes,
one of which was at the core of the vote negation and vote dilution in the
2008 presidential primaries in Florida. Primary elections were intended
as a progressive alternative to the role of party bosses in selecting a
party's candidates for the general election. The idea of permitting voters
to cast ballots for their preferred candidate, it was thought, would foster
not only good government but also party accountability. Instead, pri-
mary elections soon became mechanisms for increasing the power of
75. Giles, 189 U.S. at 488-93 (Brewer, J., dissenting). Justice Brewer wrote the Court's
opinion in James, 190 U.S. at 127.
76. Giles, 189 U.S. at 493. Justice Brewer concluded that "[i]t seems to me nothing need be
added to these decisions, and, unless they are to be considered as overruled, they are decisive of
this case."
77. HASEN'S description infra note 198, at 19 of Giles as "a case that would be more
notorious if more people paid attention to it" seems to capture the current place of the case in
election-law scholarship.
78. Pildes, supra note 69, at 317 suggests that Giles "poses in their most primordial form
questions of the relationship among law, politics, and culture, as well as the relationship of
national to state power in the fundamental sphere of democracy itself."
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party bosses, 79 negating votes, and even entrenching racial discrimina-
tion in the exercise of the franchise. Selecting party candidates through
primary elections required party managers to pay greater attention to
who was permitted to vote in the party's primary and, in consequence,
called upon party managers to develop new means of controlling who
was considered eligible to vote in primaries. In addition, political parties
necessarily worked closely with state and local governments that were
actually responsible for conducting elections. This working relationship
took various forms, but it inescapably brought political parties closer to
a position that supported claims that the parties themselves were
engaged in state action. This produced the paradox that the state-action
doctrine, which had been crafted to limit the scope of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, now became the foundation for finding that the
parties themselves were engaged in state action, which extended the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to primary elections. In response
to this paradox, political parties began to assert a countervailing claim
under the First Amendment but growing out of the state-action doctrine,
namely, that they were private associations with First Amendment rights
to associate that could not be abridged by the federal government.
These intertwined paradoxes were not fully apparent when primary
elections began to appear in the early twentieth century. The White Pri-
mary Cases addressed the paradox of a Progressive era reform-primary
elections to permit ordinary voters to displace party bosses in the selec-
tion of party candidates-that was adapted to serve the goals of Jim
Crow. Political scientists of that period generally hailed the progressive
intent of primary elections. 80 They focused on the abuses of the party
bosses and political machines. Professors Merriam and Overacker sum-
marized the prevailing critique:
The abuses that arose under a system that staked the immense spoils
of party victory on the throw of a caucus held without legal regula-
tion of any sort were numerous and varied. They ranged from brutal
violence and coarse fraud to the most refined and subtle cunning, and
included every method that seemed adapted to the all-important
object of securing the desired majority and controlling the
79. For a portrait of United States political bosses that still resonates today in it understanding
of party leaders' quest for both power and prosperity, see Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.,1948).
80. The seminal work on party primaries was written by one of the most eminent political
scientists of the day, Charles Edward Merriam, a professor of political science at the University of
Chicago and a president of the American Political Science Association. C. EDWARD MERRIAM,
PRIMARY ELECTIONS (1909). See also CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM & LOUISE OVERACKER,
PRIMARY ELECnONS (1928). Louise Overacker was an assistant professor of History &
Government at Wellesley College.
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81convention.
It was certainly not a surprise that elections could be manipulated by
either fraud or by the more subtle method of defining the primary elec-
tion rules. Mirriam and Overacker noted that "if we are considering for a
moment the prediction that boss and machine would automatically dis-
appear with the advent of the primary, it is perfectly clear that this was
not the case."82 What became clearer over time was the role of associa-
tional claims by political parties in limiting voting rights and the signifi-
cance accorded voting.
This emerging understanding of primary elections involved three
sets of issues-issues relating to voting rights, the issue of whether
primaries are elections, and the issue of whether political parties are pri-
vate associations. These issues are all present in the White Primary
cases, but each of them has developed continuing significance and the
patterns of their intersection have shifted overtime. The White Primary
cases resolved the immediate issue of the right of African American vot-
ers to participate in primary elections. The White Primary cases did not
resolve the issue of the rights of political parties to determine what vot-
ers can vote in their primaries, the issue of whether the party has the
exclusive role in making this determination, the issue of whether the
state government or the federal government or both have any role in
making this determination, and the issue of whether individuals, whether
as voters or as party members, have any effective claims to protect their
right to vote in the face of political parties' claims of associational
rights. Over time the constitutional predicate of political-party claims
has shifted from the state-action doctrine and party claims that they are
purely private associations to the First Amendment and claims that polit-
ical parties have their own constitutionally protected rights of associa-
tion, whether because political parties are private associations or because
they are expressive associations. The legacy of the state-action doctrine
as the foundation of Jim Crow lingers as the foundation of First Amend-
ment claims by political parties allowing them to shape voting rights.
This was the basis for the Democratic National Committee's confidence
that it could negate the votes cast in the 2008 Florida primary.
What recourse might be available to voters? The White Primary
cases are, above all, cases about voting and the place of voting in the
structure of the Constitution. Analyzing the White Primary cases chron-
ologically and taking each of their three elements separately, it becomes
clear that the Court could not protect voting rights by minimal procedu-
81. MERRIAM & OVERACKER, supra note 80, at 5.
82. Id. at 213. The authors presented detailed proposals for addressing the problems they
found with the operation of primary elections. Id. at 275-358.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ral analyses of the roles of political parties to determine whether their
roles in primary elections constituted state action. Instead, when the
Court appeared to have capitulated to the misuse of law to deny justice
and to have found no way to keep the state-action doctrine from under-
mining the clear purposes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
the Court reduced the salience of the doctrinal limitations of the state-
action doctrine and returned to the purposes of voting in the constitu-
tional structure. The cases in which the Court assured that African-
American citizens would be able to vote in primary elections were all
based primarily on the Fifteenth Amendment, which explicitly protects
the right to vote, as well as on Article I, Sections 2 and 4, which define a
role for the both the federal and state governments in ensuring the integ-
rity of elections. Rights of voters, considered not simply as rights of
individual voters but also as part of the structure of constitutional legiti-
macy, balanced the barriers to election participation and voters' rights
bottomed on the state-action doctrine. Whether a political party was a
private association or a delegate of state authority simply mattered less
than the right to vote and less than the constitutional principle that legiti-
mate government is based on consent. It is in this sense that the White
Primary cases remain important precedents in our own times.
The White Primary cases are attracting new attention from aca-
demic commentators 83 and generating controversy yet again. Some com-
mentators find these cases largely irrelevant, as civil rights icons from a
bygone era but analytically irrelevant to the contemporary jurisprudence
of election law.84 Others find the White Primary Cases doctrinally insuf-
83. Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of
Supreme Court Decision Making, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 56 (2001) provides a detailed history
of the White Primary Cases, shows how history shaped the Court's responses, including its
response to the state-action issue, and concludes that "The Court's most important white primary
decision, Smith v. Allwright, inaugurated a political revolution in the urban South." Klarman
documents the markedly different impact of the White Primary cases in rural and urban areas in
the South.
84. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical
Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993) notes the dilemma created by the determination in the White
Primary cases that political parties are "public" with respect to their role in conducting primary
elections. This permitted the Court to find state action for purposes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, but undercut parties' later claims that they were private associations for purposes of
their own association claims under the First Amendment. Id. at 1748-49. Lowenstein suggests
that not much would be lost if we would simply "disavow" or ignore the White Primary cases. He
reasons:
The proposal is not monstrous, because the White Primary Cases had only modest
success in extending the franchise to African-Americans in the southern states and,
more importantly, because federal voting rights legislation and greatly changed
mores make it extremely unlikely that parties would seek to exclude primary voters
on grounds of race in the foreseeable future. Renunciation now of the White
Primary Cases would have no tangible cost in racial discrimination, would bring
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ficient in their consideration of the state-action requirement of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments and suggest that the cases be
disregarded.85 Some academics have argued that the White Primary
cases are wrongly decided with respect to political parties' associational
rights and claim that they have no further precedential value in light of
Dale and other cases that have developed the concept of expressive
association.86 More recently, a greater appreciation of the White Primary
Cases as voting-rights cases has begun to appear, with some tendency to
find in these cases concepts of voting and elections that should play a
more important role in contemporary jurisprudence.87
This article analyzes the White Primary Cases as voting-rights
cases. The White Primary cases are linked with the post-Civil War vot-
ing cases in this respect. The Court was able to avoid the use of a pri-
mary election to disenfranchise African-American voters because it
focused on the purpose of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
rather than on the confines of a judicially created doctrine meant to hob-
ble enforcement of these amendments. The path was not by any means
straight or easy. But, the difficulties encountered and addressed in the
White Primary cases suggest constitutional bases for rejecting the vote
negation that occurred in the 2008 Florida primaries.
The first of the White Primary Cases, Nixon v. Herndon, involved
constitutional doctrine into accord with the common sense notion that parties are not
government agencies, and would clear the way for a full extension of constitutional
freedoms to parties. However, the White Primary Cases, despite their limited
effectiveness, are rightly remembered as one of the bright spots in the history of the
Supreme Court and the struggles for racial equality. For the Supreme Court now to
declare that the cases were wrong would be unpleasant, even disillusioning. Most of
us would never believe the Court anyway.
Id. at 1749. In effect, Lowenstein tried to limit the White Primary Cases to questions of race and
Equal Protection but could not avoid acknowledging, at least indirectly, the tension between
political parties' claims that they are private associations and voters' rights.
85. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 652-68 (1998) (calling the White Primary Cases
"untouchable icons in the legal world" but finding that the cases were based on unsustainable
reasoning about the public nature of political parties).
86. Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U.
L REV. 750 (2001) (White Primary Cases as "brooding omnipresence" that impede insightful
analysis and undermine the associational ights of political parties). Party-autonomy theories focus
on the role of political parties in orderly democratic government but not on questions relating to
the roles and rights of voters and the concept of party members. They do not ask what
relationships between political parties and voters are consistent with the democratic values they
seek to advance. In their concern with articulating a conceptual basis for the autonomy of political
parties from government, they have helped sustain arguments that political parties properly claim
autonomy from voters and party members as well.
87. Ellen D. Katz, New Issues in Minority Representation: Resurrecting the White Primary,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 326 (2004) (focus on "the core holding of the White Primary Cases,
namely that the Constitution requires that all voters have access to a jurisdiction's sole juncture of
meaningful electoral decision making").
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an African-American member of the Democratic Party of Texas whose
attempt to vote in the Democratic primary was denied by the state elec-
tion judges acting on the basis of a 1923 Texas statute that expressly
denied African-Americans the right to vote in a Democratic Party pri-
mary in Texas.88 The issue before the Court was whether the state statute
was lawful.8 9 Because denial of the right to vote in the primary was
based expressly on a state statute, there was no room for dispute over
state action. The Court held that the state statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.90 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes reasoned that:
We find it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment,
because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious
infringement of the Fourteenth. That Amendment, while it applies to
all, was passed, as we know, with a special intent to protect the
blacks from discrimination against them .... The statute of Texas in
the teeth of the prohibitions referred to assumes to forbid negroes to
take part in a primary election the importance of which we have indi-
cated, discriminating against them by the distinction of color alone.
States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe
rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear for extended argument
that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classification affect-
ing the right set up in this case[.]9'
In the absence of a credible claim based on the absence of state action,
the election judges asserted that a primary election is not an election
subject to federal government regulation. The Court refused to distin-
guish between primary and general elections. 92 Justice Holmes found no
significant difference between a vote in a general election and "a vote at
the primary election that may determine the final result." 93 The concept
of primary elections as determinative of the general-election result
became a core concept in a functional concept of state action treating
primaries and the general election as components of a single process. 94
This approach is consistent with treating elections as structural elements
of governance rather than simply a choice among candidates intended to
pick winners and losers.
The second of the White Primary Cases, Nixon v. Condon, grew out
88. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
89. Id. Klarman, supra note 83, at 58 states that the Texas statute was the only such state
statute in the United States.
90. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540-41 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) and
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 540. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV.
93. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540.
94. Compare id., with United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941); See discussion infra
Part Hl.B.
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of the response of the State of Texas and the Texas Democratic Party to
Nixon v. Herndon.95 The Texas legislature enacted legislation on an
expedited, emergency basis authorizing the state executive committee of
any political party to determine the party's membership criteria. 96 The
Executive Committee of the Texas State Democratic Party promptly
adopted a resolution limiting party membership and thus participation in
party primary elections to qualified white voters. This resolution of the
Texas Democratic Party Executive Committee replaced the Texas statute
at issue in Nixon v. Herndon.
97
In a five-four decision, the majority, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Cardozo, held that the Executive Committee of the Texas Demo-
cratic Party lacked the authority to define membership because this was
a function of the State Party convention.9 8 As a result, "[w]hatever
power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of the committee
has come to them, therefore, not as the delegates of the party, but as the
delegates of the State." 99
The Court based this conclusion on a functional concept of state
action intertwined with elements of a concept of constitutive voting. In
this analysis, the concept of constitutive voting was invoked to explain
why state action, interpreted as a limit on the discretion of state officials,
mattered in voting-rights cases. Observing that the action taken by the
party executive committee rested on a state statute, the Court reasoned
the state legislature's determination that such a statute was necessary
supports a finding of state action."° This action by the state legislature
supported treatment of the Democratic Party Executive Committee as a
state agency, with the consequence that
They are not acting in matters of merely private concern like the
directors or agents in business corporations. They are acting in mat-
ters of high public interest, matters intimately connected with the
capacity of government to exercise its functions unbrokenly and
95. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932).
96. For the language of this statute, see Part IV.A., which deals with political parties as
private associations.
97. Condon, 286 U.S. at 81-82.
98. Id. at 85.
99. Id. The reasoning continued:
Indeed, adherence to the statute leads to the conclusion that a resolution once
adopted by the committee must continue to be binding upon the judges of election
though the party in convention may have sought to override it, unless the
committee, yielding to the moral force of numbers, shall revoke its earlier action
and obey the party will. Power so entrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the State
had not conferred it, there would be hardly color of right to give a basis for its
exercise.
Id.
100. Id. at 88.
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smoothly. 101
This description of primary elections in terms of the public interest is an
element of a concept of constitutive voting. This concept of a primary
election resonates in the controversy over whether primaries are elec-
tions'02 and the claim that political parties are private association.
10 3
The force of this functional theory of state action, intertwined as it
was with elements of a theory of constitutive voting, was blunted by the
Court's emphasis on the role of the party executive committee in con-
trast to the role of the state party convention. The Court addressed this
procedural issue in purely formal terms. The Court expressed no curios-
ity about the practical operation of the Texas Democratic Party and pro-
vided no indication that it considered any information beyond formal
party documents relevant to its deliberations. This formalistic
proceduralism allowed the majority to claim that it had sidestepped the
issue of the rights of the Texas State Democratic Party as a private asso-
ciation."° This claim becomes less credible in looking back from the
present time as the Court's functional approach to state action is placed
in the context of later approaches to state action in both election law
cases and in a broader context as well. Seen in the short-term, by con-
trast, the formalist proceduralism provided a roadmap and a rationale for
the continuing efforts by the Texas legislature and the Texas Democratic
Party exclude African-American voters from primary elections.
Only three years later in Grovey v. Townsend, the Court, which
consisted of the same justices who had decided Nixon v. Condon, held
unanimously that the State Convention of the Texas Democratic Party
had the authority to exclude African-American voters from membership
and thereby from the right to vote in the party primary. 0 5 Because the
state party convention acted under party rules and not under any state
statute, the Court held that "this action upon its face is not state
action." 10 6 The functional approach to state action and its relationship to
the orderly operation of the government had no resonance in this reason-
ing, which represented instead an application of the formalist
proceduralist elements of Nixon v. Condon.
This opinion provided a guide to avoiding the intentions of the
101. Id.
102. See infra Part III.
103. See infra Part IV.A.
104. Id. at 83 (stating: "Whether a political party in Texas has inherent power today without
restraint by any law to determine its own membership, we are not required at this time to affirm or
deny."); See discussion infra Part W.A.
105. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 48, 54-55 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
106. Grovey, 295 U.S. at 48.
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post-Civil War amendments and to entrenching Jim Crow in the South.
The claim was generally that the Fifteenth Amendment did not control
because a primary is not an election and participation in a primary is not
constitutionally protected voting."°7 Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments required state action, but a political party was a purely
private association even when it organized primary elections. This is a
circular argument based on the assertion that because primaries are not
elections a political party is a private association and is not engaged in
state action when it structures primary elections and then the assertion
that because political parties are private association primaries are not
elections. Under this reasoning, an African-American who shared the
political beliefs of the Texas Democratic Party could be denied member-
ship in the party and thus the right to vote in the party primary. Although
Grovey was subsequently overruled, its reasoning lives on the associa-
tional claims of political parties and the Court's readiness to accord
party managers full discretion in asserting these claims.,0 8
The Court in Grovey attempted to neutralize claims that voting
rights should be accorded independent significance and that the concept
of voting encompasses the concept of casting a vote that may make a
difference to the eventual outcome of the election. In Nixon v. Herndon
the Court had accorded independent significance to the idea of participa-
tion in a competitive election.109 Without referring to its prior decision,
the Court in Grovey rejected this claim:
The argument is that as a negro may not be denied a ballot at a gen-
eral election on account of his race or color, if exclusion from the
primary renders his vote at the general election insignificant and use-
less, the result is to deny him the suffrage altogether. So to say is to
confuse the privilege of membership in a party with the right to vote
for one who is to hold a public office. With the former the state need
have no concern, with the latter it is bound to concern itself, for the
general election is a function of the state government and discrimina-
tion by the state as respects participation by negroes on account of
their race or color is prohibited by the Federal Constitution. 1 °
Grovey shows the jurisprudential error of the proceduralist formalism of
Nixon v. Condon and the consequences of failing to understand voting as
an element of constitutional structure. The persistent echoes of Grovey
through the years should, at the very least, be cause for reassessment of
107. Id. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of whether a primary is an election and whether
participation in a primary constitutes voting.
108. Grovey can be seen as the wellspring of the cases that ground discrimination by
organization managers against particular persons seeking to become members, most notably Dale.
See infra Part IV for a discussion of these cases.
109. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
110. Grovey, 295 U.S. at 54-55.
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the cases in which the Court all too readily embraced the associational
claims of party managers at the expense of the rights of voters.
Six years later in a four-to-three decision, the Court reversed course
and held in United States v. Classic that voters have a right to have their
votes counted in a primary election."' The United States charged that
commissioners of elections in Louisiana conspired to alter and falsely
count and certify votes cast in a state primary."2 The District Court
sustained a demurrer to two counts of the indictment." 3 The United
States appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the District
Court. "14
The Supreme Court reasoned that the issue was controlled by Arti-
cle I, Sections 2 and 4."5 Although state action did not apply to these
constitutional predicates, the Court addressed elements of the case in
terms that would have sustained state action had it been constitutionally
relevant. This was particularly apparent in the Court's determination that
a primary is an election subject to regulation under the Constitution."
6
The majority observed that the primary was "conducted by the state at
public expense" and was "subject to numerous statutory regulations.""' 7
The Court observed that the practical effect of the primary election was
to determine who would become the member of Congress from the Sec-
ond District of Louisiana" 8 and found that
[i]nterference with the right to vote in the Congressional primary in
the Second Congressional District for the choice of Democratic can-
didate for Congress is thus, as a matter of law and in fact, an interfer-
ence with the effective choice of the voters at the only stage of the
election procedure when their choice is of significance, since it is at
the only stage when such interference could have any practical effect
on the ultimate result, the choice of the Congressman to represent the
district. The primary in Louisiana is an integral part of the procedure
for the popular choice of Congressman. The right of qualified voters
to vote at the Congressional primary in Louisiana and to have their
111. 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).
112. Id. at 307.
113. United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 66, 69 (E.D. La. 1940), rev'd, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
In so holding, the District Court relied on early negative cases, particularly United States v.
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917) and Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
114. Classic, 313 U.S. at 329.
115. Id. at 311. The primary at issue was a primary to select a candidate for Congress, which
brought this primary within the language of section 2 and 4 of Article I.
116. For an analysis of this issue, see discussion infra Part III.
117. Classic, 313 U.S. at 311.
118. Id. at 313-14. The Court based these observations on contemporary political-science
studies. See Id. at 314, n.2. More recently, the Court has challenged the use of political-science
studies in campaign-finance cases. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 354 (2003) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467 n.4 (2007).
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ballots counted is thus the right to participate in that choice.' 1 9
The Court's emphasis on "effective choice" echoes the language in
Nixon v. Herndon relating to the right to vote in that part of the electoral
process that controls the final outcome.
The Court held that this right to choose representatives is guaran-
teed to the people under the Constitution. 2 ° Citing Article I, Section 2
for the proposition that the Constitution "commands that Congressmen
shall be chosen by the people of the several states by electors," the Court
reasoned that
[t]he right of the people to choose, whatever its appropriate constitu-
tional limitations, where in other respects it is defined, and the mode
of its exercise is prescribed by state action in conformity to the Con-
stitution, is a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and
hence is one secured by it to those citizens and inhabitants of the state
entitled to exercise the right.
1 21
The Court cited the post-Civil War voting-rights cases, Ex parte Yar-
brough and United States v. Mosley, in support of its reading of the
Constitution.12 The Court then distinguished its post-Civil War prece-
dents denying voting rights, including Minor v. Happersett,'23 by
observing that
[w]hile, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Con-
gress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states....
this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized
by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of
Art. I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the
exercise of its powers to regulate elections under § 4 and its more
general power under Article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers.
'"124
The Court then addressed the specific action at issue in this case,
the alleged conspiracy to exclude and not count the votes of all qualified
voters. The Court concluded that "[o]bviously included within the right
to choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters
within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congres-
119. Classic, 313 U.S. at 314.
120. Id. at 314-15.
121. Id. at 314.
122. Id. These cases are discussed supra Part II.A.
123. Classic, 313 U.S. at 315 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1892); Breedlove
v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937).
124. Classic, 313 U.S. at 315 (citing Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283; McPherson, 146 U.S. at
38-39; Reese, 92 U.S. at 217-18; Happersett, 88 U.S. at 162).
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sional elections.' 25 In so holding, the Court rejected the relevance of
the state-action doctrine. The Court reasoned with respect to Article I,
Section 2, that "since the constitutional command is without restriction
or limitation, the right, unlike those guaranteed by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, is secured against the action of individuals as
well as of states."'
' 26
Instead of relying on a formalistic state-action analysis, the Court
articulated a jurisprudential framework focusing on constitutional pur-
poses derived from Chief Justice Marshall's observation in McCulloch v.
Maryland, "it is a Constitution we are expounding."' 27 The Court
reasoned:
That the free choice by the people of representatives in Congress,
subject only to the restrictions to be found in §§ 2 and 4 of Article I
and elsewhere in the Constitution, was one of the great purposes of
our constitutional scheme of government cannot be doubted. We can-
not regard it as any the less the constitutional purpose, or its words as
any the less guarantying the integrity of that choice, when a state,
exercising its privilege in the absence of Congressional action,
changes the mode of choice from a single step, a general election, to
two, of which the first is the choice at a primary of those candidates
from whom, a second step, the representative in Congress is to be
chosen at the election.
128
The Court extended the same reasoning to Article I, Section 4,
which gives Congress the authority to regulate the "time, place, and
manner" of elections to federal office.'2 9 Observing that the ways that
the people chose their representatives had changed over time even
125. Classic, 313 U.S. at 315 (citing United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915), Exparte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)).
126. Classic, 313 U.S. at 315 (citing Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 651).
127. Classic, 313 U.S. at 316. The Court embraced the concept of a living Constitution, and
applied it to Article I, Section 2 in the following terms:
We may assume that the framers of the Constitution in adopting that section, did not
have specifically in mind the selection and elimination of candidates for Congress
by the direct primary any more than they contemplated the application of the
commerce clause to interstate telephone, telegraph and wireless communication,
which are concededly within it. For in setting up an enduring framework of
government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the
vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the
instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we read legislative codes
which are subject to continuous revision with the changing course of events, but as
the revelation of the great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the
Constitution as a continuing instrument of government. If we remember than 'it is a
Constitution we are expounding,' we cannot rightly prefer, of the possible meanings
of its words, that which will defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose.
Id. at 315-16. (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 316-17.
129. Id. at 317; U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4.
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before the ratification of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the
framers could not have intended to adopt a narrow reading of either
Section 2 or Section 4 of Article I when the issue was the protection of
the people's right to choose.
130
The dissent by Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black and Justice
Murphy, turned on the issue of whether the criminal penalties enacted by
Congress had been defined with sufficient precision. 1 3 1 Nevertheless, the
dissent was careful to endorse the majority's position on the constitu-
tional significance of voting. The dissent began with the observation that
"[f]ree and honest elections are the very foundation of our republican
form of government," citing Ex parte Yarbrough on the dangers posed
by efforts to control elections through violence and corruption.
32
Three years later in Smith v. Allwright 133 the Court overruled
Grovey v. Townsend 34 in yet another case in which an African-Ameri-
can voter had been denied the right to vote in the Democratic Party
primary. The claims in this case were based on the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendment. 135 The Court held that any doubt that primary elec-
tions involved state action had been resolved by United States v. Classic,
which the Court in Smith v. Allwright linked with Ex parte Yar-
brough.1 36 In the end, the Court put the right to vote at the center of its
decision to overrule Grovey v. Townsend, reasoning:
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law
grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected
officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant
to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a
State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a
private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election.
Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus
130. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318, 320.
131. Id. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent took the position that the criminal
statute did not set forth the criminal offense with "the requisite specificity." Id. at 340. The issue
of criminal penalties has been a pervasive theme in the dissents in the cases upholding statutes
regulation campaign finance in elections to federal office. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 338 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132. Classic, 313 U.S. at 329. For an analysis of Ex parte Yarbrough, see Supra Part I.A.
133. 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944). Klarman, supra note 83, at 64-66, finds that this is the most
important of the White Primary Cases in terms of its practical effect on African-American voting
rights.
134. 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). This case is
discussed supra Part I1.B and infra Part 111.
135. Smith, 321 U.S. at 650-51. The primary at issue in this case involved both federal and
state offices, which meant that reliance on sections 2 & 4 of Article I would have raised questions
of whether they applied to the non-federal offices. The Court made no reference to the difference
in constitutional predicates in its reliance on Classic.
136. Id. at 661-62.
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indirectly denied.' 37
Justice Roberts dissented, in part on grounds of the factual differ-
ences between the Texas and Louisiana primaries, but primarily on
grounds of the undesirability of the rapid overruling of precedent.' 38 He
observed that overruling a decision announced nine years earlier "tends
to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted
railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."' 39 Justice Roberts
insisted that stability was a constitutional virtue and a duty of the Court,
a duty that the Court, in his view, had failed to discharge. 140
The last of the White Primary cases, Terry v. Adams, was decided
by a fragmented Court nine years later, in 1953,'" only a year before the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.'42 Terry v. Adams remains
the most controversial of the White Primary Cases, with critics claiming
that none of the three opinions for the majority articulated a principled
analysis sustaining a determination that the activities at issue constituted
state action. 143 This article suggests that prevailing interpretations of
Terry v. Adams should be reconsidered. It is entirely possible to con-
clude that the very difficulty posed by the facts for what had become
standard analyses of state action helped the majority in its three opinions
to move to a functional analysis of state action in the specific context of
primary elections. The article also suggests that the tendency to view the
result in Terry v. Adams as an example of unprecedented judicial willful-
ness based on a laudable result but unsustainable reasoning is itself
untenable. Such an interpretation results from reading "lines" of cases
dealing with a particular topic without considering the other jurispruden-
tial developments that had been decided in the same time frame and
which make the decision appear more grounded in a broader jurispru-
dence of equal protection.
Terry v. Adams is best understood not solely as one of the White
Primary cases but also in terms of shifts in the Court's concept of state
137. Id. at 664.
138. Id. at 666, 669-70.
139. Id. at 669.
140. Id. at 670. Justice Roberts concluded his dissent with the observation that
[i]t is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose
greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has been
looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would
hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion, should
now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to
the stability of our institutions.
Id.
141. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
142. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. Klarman, supra note 83, at 68-69; Issacharof & Pildes, supra note 85, at 655-60.
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action. The most notable such shift took place in the landmark case of
Shelley v. Kraemer,'" which was decided five years before Terry v.
Adams and four years after Smith v. Allwright. In Shelley v. Kraemer, in
which the Court struck down racially restrictive covenants in deeds of
residential property, the Court found sufficient state action to sustain a
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment in the enforcement of these cov-
enants by state courts.1 45 Even though the covenants themselves were set
forth in private contracts between private parties, the Court held that the
petitioners' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated
because "but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by
the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to
occupy the properties in question without restraint."'146 The Court found
that
State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.
And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this
Court to enforce the constitutional commands.1
47
It is true, of course, that state action continued to prove challenging
and nettlesome to the Court in specific cases. But, it is also true that
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer grounds the rea-
soning of the three opinions written by members of the majority in Terry
v. Adams in a functional, contextual concept of state action in a way that
is easily missed if one considers it only in the White Primary Cases
themselves.
Terry v. Adams involved an association, the Jaybird Democratic
Association or Jaybird Party, which held a primary election for candi-
dates for county offices prior to the official primary election of the
county Democratic Party.' 4 8 Membership in the Jaybird Association was
automatically extended to all whites who registered to vote as members
of the Democratic Party. Registration was conducted by county govern-
ment officials, not by either the Jaybird Association or by the Demo-
cratic Party. The Jaybird Association claimed that it was not a political
party and, in consequence, was not subject to government regulation at
all because its activities did not constitute state action.
149
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas and Justice Burton, cited
testimony from the Jaybird Association president stating that one of the
144. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
145. Id. 13-14.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 20.
148. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953).
149. Id. at 462-63.
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purposes of the organization was to exclude African-Americans from
voting and that this was the reason that the Jaybird primary was held
before the Democratic Party primary. Justice Black concluded that "[t]he
Jaybird Party thus brings into being and holds precisely the kind of elec-
tion that the Fifteenth Amendment seeks to prevent."'' 51 Justice Black
found state action in the existence of a duplicate, parallel primary oper-
ated by the Jaybird Party, reasoning that
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to
permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of
the Fifteenth Amendment. The use of the county-operated primary to
ratify the result of the prohibited election merely compounds the
offense. It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by such cir-
cumvention, to permit within its borders the use of any device that
produces an equivalent of the prohibited election.
1 51
Calling the Jaybird primary "an integral part, indeed the only effective
part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in
the county," Justice Black concluded that:
The effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird primary plus Democratic
primary plus general election, is to do precisely that which the Fif-
teenth Amendment forbids-strip Negroes of every vestige of influ-
ence in selecting the officials who control the local county matters
that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens.152
This reasoning expresses a concept of consent expressed through voting
in a meaningful election as the basis of government legitimacy. Denial
of an opportunity for such consent based on the race of the voter was
inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.
Justice Frankfurter observed that "[t]his case is for me by no means
free of difficulty." '53 His difficulty centered on state action. Justice
Frankfurter noted that membership was open only to registered white
voters as determined by the election rolls maintained by the county and
that the balloting rules generally paralleled those set forth in the state
statute regulating the conduct of primary elections. Nevertheless, Justice
Frankfurter found that "formal State action, either by way of legislative
recognition or official authorization, is wholly wanting."'' 54 This was,
however, only the beginning of Justice Frankfurter's analysis, which has
been mischaracterized and even ridiculed as resting primarily on the
observation that county officials participated in the Jaybird primary by
150. Id. at 469.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 469-70.
153. Id. at 472.
154. Id. at 471.
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simply voting in it.'
55
Justice Frankfurter's critique of such participation is that it was "a
wholly successful effort to withdraw significance from the State-pre-
scribed primary, to subvert the operation of what is formally the law of
the State for primaries in this country."1 56 Justice Frankfurter found state
action in the relationship of the Jaybird primary to the official state pri-
mary. Observing that "[t]he State of Texas has entered into a compre-
hensive scheme of regulation of political primaries, including
procedures by which election officials shall be chosen,"'' 57 he found the
long history through which county election officials "participated in and
condoned a continued effort to exclude Negroes from voting" violated
the Fifteenth Amendment as part of a "scheme to subvert the operation
of the official primary."' 58 The existence of this larger plan or scheme,
made the various separate steps in the plan unlawful under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Justice Frankfurter reasoned as follows:
The State here devised a process for primary elections. The right of
all citizens to share in it, and not to be excluded by unconstitutional
bars, is emphasized by the fact that in Texas nomination in the Dem-
ocratic primary is tantamount to election. The exclusion of the
Negroes from meaningful participation in the only primary scheme
set up by the State was not an accidental, unsought consequence of
the exercise of civic rights by voters to make their common view-
point count. It was the design, the very purpose of this arrangement
that the Jaybird primary in May exclude Negro participation in July.
That it was the action in part of the election officials charged by
Texas law with the fair administration of the primaries, brings it
within reach of the law. The officials made themselves party to
means whereby the machinery with which they are entrusted does not
discharge the function for which it was designed.'
59
For Justice Frankfurter, then, this betrayal of the duties of public office
constituted state action. The public trust at issue here was the opportu-
nity for African-Americans eligible to vote to participate in constituting
the government of the county through voting. No government that con-
spires to condone a scheme that subverts the opportunity for participa-
155. Id. at 473-74. Justice Frankfurter did note that county election officials "join the white
voting community in proceeding with elaborate formality, in almost all respects parallel to the
procedures dictated by Texas law for the primary itself." Contrary to the interpretation of some
commentators, Justice Frankfurter found state action in the consequences of this participation, not
in the participation itself. Id.
156. Id. at 474.
157. Id. at 475.
158. Id. at 476.
159. Id. at 476-77.
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tion and consent can escape the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment
according to this reasoning.
Justice Frankfurter was grappling with the difficult matter of form
and substance in legal analysis. In this enterprise, he relied on cases that
"have pierced the various manifestations of astuteness."' 6 ° He clearly
regarded the Jaybird Association as one of these form based "manifesta-
tions of astuteness" that should be "pierced" by an analysis of the sub-
stance of its operations. In this case, he argued that the Jaybird
Association's apparent independence from the Democratic Party could
not obscure its important role in the electoral process. It was this matter
of substance, the Jaybird Association's role in elections, not local offi-
cial's participation in the Jaybird primary, that provided the legal basis
of Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that the Jaybird Association primary
was state action subject to constitutional requirements of equal protec-
tion for African-American voters.
Justice Clark, joined by Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Reed, and
Justice Jackson, based his opinion on the concept in Smith v. Allwright
that elections are multistep processes and each step is subject to the con-
stitutional prohibitions on racial discrimination.' 6 ' Describing the
Jaybird Democratic Association as "part and parcel of the Democratic
Party"' 62 or as "an auxiliary of the local Democratic Party organiza-
tion,"' 63 Justice Clark focused on what the Jaybird Association did and
not on an essentialist analysis of what is inherently was determined by
applying abstract legal doctrine. From this perspective, Justice Clark
described the Jaybird Association as "selecting its [the Democratic
Party's] nominees and using its machinery for carrying out an admitted
design of destroying the weight and effect of Negro ballots in Fort Bend
County." 16 Under Justice Clark's activity-focused functional analysis,
whether the Jaybird Association was a political party or not was consti-
tutionally irrelevant because it had become "the locus of effective politi-
cal choice" and "the decisive power in the county's recognized electoral
process."'' 65 As a result, permitting African-Americans to vote in the
official Democratic Party primary and the general election offered only
''an empty vote cast after the real decisions are made" and "the Negro
minority's vote is nullified at the sole stage of the local political process
where the bargaining and interplay of rival political forces would make
160. Id. at 474. Justice Frankfurter cited Smith v. Allwright.
161. Id. at 481-82.
162. Id. at 482.
163. Id. at 483.
164. Id. at 483-84.
165. Id. at 484.
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it count."'
166
Justice Clark addressed state action directly, citing the Court's
determ'nation in Shelley v. Kraemer that the Fourteenth Amendment
"refers to exertions of state power in all forms."'167 Justice Clark
extended this analysis to the Fifteenth Amendment as well.168 Justice
Clark then reasoned:
Accordingly, when a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form
which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested choice
of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes
on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safe-
guards in play.
169
Justice Clark's opinion rested on the constitutional significance of
consent by voters. There can be no consent without meaningful choice
and unobstructed participation. Voting as an element of constitutional
structure was accorded precedence over adherence to any particular
interpretation of a judicially created doctrine when it conflicted with vot-
ing as a means of constituting legitimate government.
It is noteworthy that Justice Jackson joined the majority and that he
joined the opinion authored by Justice Clark, with its functional interpre-
tation of state action. Justice Jackson's law clerk, William Rehnquist,
had urged Justice Jackson to dissent on grounds that the draft opinions
for the majority misconstrued the state-action doctrine. 7 ' Rehnquist
took the position that Justice Black's opinion "simply assumes the
whole point of the issue," which Rehnquist took to be the state-action
doctrine and which he interpreted as a limit on the authority of Congress
to enlarge the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment.' 7 ' He concluded that
"the Black opinion utterly fails to face the problem of state action."' 72
Rehnquist saw Justice Black's opinion as result driven, an approach he
found unprincipled because it ignored doctrine. Rehnquist concluded
that "[slurely the justices of this Court do not sit here to ruthlessly frus-
trate results which they consider undesirable, regardless of the working
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948)).
168. Terry, 345 U.S. at 484. Justice Clark began the relevant sentence with the observation,
"[c]onsonant with the broad and loft aims of its Framers, the Fifteenth Amendment, as the
Fourteenth," followed by the language quoted in the text.
169. Id. (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) and United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 324 (1941)).
170. William H. Rehnquist, Re: Opinions of Black and FF in Terry v. Adams (Memorandum
for Justice Robert Jackson), in SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLMCAL PROCESS 114, 114-15
(Rev. 2d ed. 2002). There appear to have been only two "majority opinions" when Rehnquist
prepared his memorandum.
171. Id. at 114.
172. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of the Constitution."' 173
Rehnquist was briskly dismissive of the Frankfurter draft opinion,
finding his support for his finding of state action as "skimpy." 174 While
it is useful to remember that Rehnquist was reacting to a draft and that
the draft he referenced may have differed substantially, Rehnquist
described Frankfurter's concept of support for state action as consisting
solely of the fact that "the county election officials voted in the Jaybird
primary." 175 Rehnquist leveled three charges against this reasoning:
In the first place, they voted not in their capacity as election officials,
but as private citizens. Secondly, it was not their voting which
effected the discrimination; it was the previously adopted rules, with
which they may have had nothing to do. Thirdly, if this is the vice,
why not simply enjoin the officials from voting? When one must
strain this hard to reach a result, the chances are that something is the
matter with the result.
1 76
As discussed above, the final Frankfurter opinion took a much richer and
more nuanced approach to state action based on a framework of consti-
tutive voting and the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. Rehnquist
clearly took greater interest in judicial doctrine, at least when the doc-
trine at issue served his own interests in limiting the scope of federal-
government authority.
The final section of the Rehnquist memorandum to Justice Jackson
was introduced by the caption "[y]our ideas" and began with the obser-
vation that "the Constitution does not prevent the majority from banding
together, nor does it attaint success in the effort."' 7 7 Rehnquist then
urged that "[i]t is about time the Court faced the fact that white people in
the South don't like colored people." 178 The jurisprudential principle
that Rehnquist derived from this observation was that "the Supreme
Court is not a watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination
raises its admittedly ugly head."' 7 9 Rehnquist expressed his fundamental
concern about the two draft opinions in terms of freedom of association
for the majority, concluding that "[t]o the extent that this decision
advances the frontier of state action and 'social gain', it pushes back the
frontier of freedom of association and majority rule."' 80 As is discussed







180. Id. Rehnquist observed pointedly: "Liberals should be the first to realize, after the past
twenty years, that it does not do to push blindly through towards one constitutional goal without
paying attention to other equally desirable values that are being trampled on in the process."
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in Part IV, William Rehnquist, during his long tenure on the Court, dedi-
cated himself to developing a concept of freedom of association indistin-
guishable from nonparticipatory association in which party
organizations and voluntary associations were equated with the views of
their leaders and offered no scope for members to express their views
about the direction of the organization. All of that was in the future in
1953, when Rehnquist urged Justice Jackson to adopt this position, argu-
ing that "[t]his is a position that I am sure ought to be stated; but if
stated by Vinson, Minton, or Reed it just won't sound the same way as if
you state it.' 18 1 In the end, Justice Jackson, along with Justice Reed and
Chief Justice Vinson, joined the majority opinion written by Justice
Clark, which is discussed above.
The lone dissenter was Justice Minton, who made it clear that his
dissent turned on the state-action doctrine.' 82 Beginning his dissent with
the observation that "I am not concerned in the least as to what happens
to the Jaybirds or their unworthy scheme," he then stated that "I am
concerned about what this Court says is state action within the meaning
of the Fifteenth Amendment."' 83 Justice Minton found that Justice Black
simply ignored the question of state action because he wanted to address
the wrong, a position that Justice Minton described as "praiseworthy"
but "not in accord with the Constitution."' 84 In terms closely akin to the
analysis in the Rehnquist memorandum to Justice Jackson, he rejected
Frankfurter's opinion out of hand. In this case, there is no doubt that
Justice Minton would have seen Justice Frankfurter's fully developed
argument, which is not represented in the reference in the dissent. While
Justice Minton acknowledged that "Mr. Justice Clark seems to recognize
that state action must be shown," he concluded that "[h]e finds state
action in assumption, not in facts." '185 Justice Minton took specific aim
at Justice Clark's analysis of the relationship between the Jaybird Asso-
ciation and the Democratic Party as a "gratuitous assumption." 86 After
a review of stipulations from the record, Justice Minton found "the com-
plete absence of any compliance with the state law or practice, or coop-
eration by or with the State."' 87 He then rejected the claim that the State
of Texas' failure to prevent the exclusion of African-American voters
from the Jaybird primary constitute state action.' 88 Justice Minton
181. Id.
182. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. at 484-94 (Minton, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 484-85.
184. Id. at 485.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 486.
187. Id. at 489.
188. Id. Justice Minton conceded that the Jaybird primary "is not forbidden by the law of the
State of Texas" and asked: "Does such failure of the State to act to prevent individuals from doing
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rejected the a functional concept of state action, taking instead the posi-
tion that
It is only when the State by action of its legislative bodies or action of
some of its officials in their official capacity cooperates with such
political party or gives it direction in its activities that the Federal
Constitution may come into play. A political organization not using
state machinery or depending upon state law to authorize what it does
could not be within the ban of the Fifteenth Amendment.
189
This presentation of his view of the facts provided the basis for Justice
Minton's claim that Smith v. Allwright, where he found that "the State of
Texas made the Democratic Party its agent for the conducting of a Dem-
ocratic primary," did not control the outcome in Terry v. Adams.' 90 In
this case, Justice Minton characterized the Jaybird primary as a "straw
vote," which he described in the following terms:
What the Jaybird Association did here was to conduct as individuals,
separate and apart from the Democratic Party or the State, a straw
vote as to who should receive the Association's endorsement for
county and precinct offices. It has been successful in seeing that those
who receive its endorsement are nominated and elected. That is true
of concerted action by any group. In numbers there is strength. In
organization there is effectiveness. Often a small minority of stock-
holders control a corporation. Indeed, it is almost an axiom of corpo-
rate management that a small, cohesive group may control, especially
in the larger corporations where the holdings are widely diffused. '91
Justice Minton's use of analogy to corporate control is not persuasive
because it fails to address the idea that voting is a distinctive activity
through which ordinary citizens constitute legitimate government. The
same can be said of his observation that the Jaybird primary was indis-
tinguishable from other pressure group activity and his conclusion that
the Court does not review the activities of pressure groups.' 92 In the end,
Justice Minton found that the majority had treated the Jaybird primary as
state action because they disliked the Jaybird Association's goals. 193
This was the same conclusion reached by William Rehnquist, albeit in
harder-edged terms.
what they have the right as individuals to do amount to state action? "Justice Minton responded to
his own question: "I venture the opinion it does not." Id.
189. Id. at 490.
190. Id. at 492.
191. Id. at 493.
192. Id. at 494.
193. Id. Justice Minton concluded:
In this case the majority have found that this pressure group's work does constitute
state action. The basis of this conclusion is rather difficult to ascertain. Apparently it
derives mainly from a dislike of the goals of the Jaybird Association. I share that
dislike. I fail to see how it makes state action.
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Terry v. Adams retains its relevance to contemporary controversies
over the role of political parties in structuring primary elections. Its frag-
mented opinions set forth the foundations of the controversies pitting
voting rights against political-party associational claims that provided
the predicates for vote negation in the 2008 Florida primaries.
The White Primary Cases are complex cases that address voting
rights, the question of whether primaries are elections, and the origin of
the idea that political parties are private associations. While the White
Primaries ended the dispute over whether primaries are elections, the
issue of whether political parties are private associations had not yet
taken its modem form. During the White Primary Cases, the issue was
state action, which was at the heart of Terry v. Adams. This issue was to
be transformed into a First Amendment claim that political parties have
associational claims that can legitimately serve as a counterweight to
claims of voting rights. The role of William Rehnquist, who then served
as a law clerk but who would serve on the Court when the cases
entrenching the idea of parties as private associations and extending this
reasoning to claims that political parties are expressive associations were
decided, provides a link between the reasoning in the minority and what
became the majority position in the cases addressing the associational
claims of political parties. Neither Rehnquist, the law clerk, nor Justice
Minton, the author of the dissent, took account of the structural constitu-
tional role of voting. The three majority opinions in Terry v. Adams all
did. This was the difference between Grovey v. Townsend and the other
White Primary Cases as well.
The White Primary Cases defined elements of a concept of consti-
tutive voting that drew upon the reasoning in the post-Civil War cases
discussed in Part 11A. The White Primary Cases focused on why com-
petitiveness matters in elections, on why access to participation matters,
and why all voters' votes should be taken into account.
As is discussed in Part 1IC, the Court extended this reasoning to
vote dilution in the redistricting cases. These cases deal directly with the
issue of equality in public affairs, which encompassed equality in consti-
tuting legitimate government. The voting-dilution cases did not raise
issues of state action or issues of the associational claims of political
parties. They address instead an additional element of constitutive vot-
ing, the idea that votes should be taken into account equally, that each
voter's vote should have equal significance.
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C. One Person, One Vote: The Struggle Against Vote Dilution
Baker v. Carr is the seminal vote-dilution case.' 94 The issue here
was not fraud or violence or corruption. The rights of voters did not
clash with the associational claims of political parties. The issue here
was the weight and significance of each vote determined by the number
of persons in each legislative district. While the focus on the signifi-
cance of each vote may initially appear less dramatic than the facts in
the post-Civil War cases or the White Primary Cases, it goes to the heart
of the concept of consent as the foundation of legitimate government.
This is the enduring legacy of Baker v. Carr, and it remains the core
issue in contemporary disputes over gerrymanders of all types.
The vote-dilution cases have another legacy as well. Instead of a
focus on the role and rights of all voters, the vote-dilution cases address
the significance of one vote weight against other votes. This unavoidable
comparison threatens at times to obscure the fundamental point, the rela-
tionship of equal significance of votes to consent in ensuring the legiti-
macy of governmet authority. Baker v. Carr and the cases decided in the
following two years addressed this element of vote dilution, sometimes
directly but more often indirectly, in a series of essays on political the-
ory. While these essays may seem only tangentially relevant, they under-
score the justice's efforts to transcend arithmetic equality and to address
the reasons that this kind of equality matters to democracy. The
post-Civil War voting-rights cases and the White Primary Cases serve
as precedents in these opinions.
This case involved two oral arguments and multiple opinions-a
majority opinion on a narrow but seminal issue, three concurring opin-
ions, and two dissents. In the year after it was decided, over one-hundred
cases based on its reasoning were filed in the United States District
Courts. The next year the Court decided another seminal case based on
Equal Protection claims against vote dilution, Gray v. Sanders. 195 The
year after that the Court decided two additional seminal cases striking
down vote dilution on Equal Protection grounds, Reynolds v. Sims' 96 and
Wesberry v. Sanders.'97 Much of the contemporary discussion of these
cases deals with the degree of equality that can be achieved and at what
price.' 98 These are important ongoing issues, to be sure. But, they are
not the focus here. The focus here is on the vote-dilution cases as part of
194. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
195. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
196. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
197. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
198. See RicHARD L. HAsEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore (New York University Press 2003).
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the jurisprudence of voting and the rights of voters and the role of the
federal and state government to ensure these rights to the people of the
United States.
Baker v. Carr involved the failure to reapportion the Tennessee
General Assembly, which consisted of a Senate with thirty-three mem-
bers and a House of Representatives with ninety-nine members, between
1901 and 1961,199 despite the substantial relocation of the population
from rural to urban areas.2" Voters claimed that this failure to reappor-
tion violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 '
The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 2  The Supreme Court, after two oral arguments, reversed
the District Court and remanded the case to the District Court, which
was charged with devising a remedy. The Supreme Court did not con-
sider the merits directly, although it discussed the merits in some consid-
erable detail. 2 3 The Court instead addressed three issues that had served
as the basis for limiting the Court's involvement in voting-rights cases
since it had decided the White Primary cases. The three issues are sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, 2 ° standing,
2 5 and justiciability.206
In holding that the Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Court cited the White Primary cases for the proposition that the Dis-
trict Courts have subject matter jurisdiction under the criminal statutes
enacted to redress deprivations of rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,20 7 finding that "[a]n unbroken
line of our precedents sustains the federal courts' jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of federal constitutional claims of this nature. 20 8
The issue of justiciability turned on the relevance of the political-
question doctrine, which had formed the basis of the District Court's
holding.20 9 The Court observed that "the mere fact that the suit seeks
protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political ques-
199. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188 (1962).
200. Id. at 192-93.
201. Id. at 193-94.
202. Id. at 196; Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) (per curiam), rev'd,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
203. Baker, 369 U.S. at 197.
204. Id. at 198-204.
205. Id. at 204-08 (the Court determined that it did not have to resolve the standing issue).
206. Id. at 208-28.
207. Id. at 200 & n.19 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927)).
208. Baker, 369 U.S. at 201.
209. Id. at 209.
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tion."'21° The Court held that the District Court had misinterpreted and
misapplied Colegrove v. Green as compelling this result.21 ' The Court
read Colegrove as standing for the proposition that the only constitu-
tional predicate for a redistricting claim is the Guaranty Clause of Arti-
cle IV, Section 4, which is a nonjusticiable political question, but does
not address the possibility that any other constitutional predicate would
also make the issue here a political question.212 The Court then reasoned
that the Equal Protection Clause does not pose an issue of justiciability
and that the political-question doctrine itself has been interpreted in a far
more flexible manner with respect to various issues than the District
Court understood. 213 In disposing of the political-question doctrine as a
barrier against judicial consideration of voting-rights issues when these
raise constitutional rights other than those of a republican form of gov-
ernment under the Guarantee Clause, the Court entered the "political
thicket" against the advice of Justice Frankfurter, who had written the
majority opinion in Colegrove2 4 and in the face of his dissent here. 1 5
Having removed the political-question doctrine as a barrier to judicial
consideration of vote-dilution claims, the Court remanded the matter to
the District Court.216 While it may appear that the Court decided very
little, it proved to have decided the issue that mattered by opening fed-
eral courts to voters when it held that the political-question doctrine did
not preclude federal courts' hearing vote-dilution cases.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas emphasized the funda-
mental structural nature of voting rights.217 Observing that "[s]o far as
voting rights are concerned, there are large gaps in the Constitution,"
Justice Douglas found that "[y]et the right to vote is inherent in the
republican form of government envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution. ' 218 He based his analysis in substantial part on both the
early post-Civil War voting-rights cases and on the White Primary
cases.2 19 Justice Douglas sought both to limit the scope of the political-
question doctrine220 and to establish the Equal Protection Clause as the
210. Id. (citing Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540 (stating that such an objection to justiciability "is
little more than a play upon words.").
211. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
212. Id. at 209-10.
213. Id. at 209-29.
214. For a discussion of efforts to craft a majority opinion that would have avoided a dissent
by Frankfurter, see Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 297 (Michael C. Doff ed., Foundation Press 2004).
215. Baker, 369 U.S. at 266-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 237.
217. Id. at 241-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 242.
219. Id. at 242-50.
220. See id. at 241-46.
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constitutional predicate for redistricting claims.22' These two objectives
were related to Justice Douglas' reasoning relating to the scope of the
federal government's role with respect to protecting voting rights,
including voting rights in state elections, and the role of the judicial
branch in the protection of voting rights.222 Justice Douglas found that a
state may not base its election laws on qualifications based on factors
that discriminate based on race, gender, or any other violation of Equal
Protection.223 To this end, Justice Douglas cited the post-Civil War vot-
ing-rights cases and the White Primary cases in support of his observa-
tion that "[t]he right to vote in both federal and state elections was
protected by the judiciary long before that right received the explicit
protection it is now accorded in § 1343(4)."224 He also used these cases
to establish that "[i]ntrusion of the Federal Government into the election
machinery of the States has taken numerous forms" including investiga-
tions, criminal proceedings, collection of penalties, suits for declaratory
relief and for an injunction, and suits under the Civil Rights Act to
enjoin discriminatory practices.225
Justice Douglas rejected claims that legislative-apportionment
issues were too complex for courts:
It is said that any decision in cases of this kind is beyond the compe-
tence of courts. Some make the same point as regards the problem of
equal protection in cases involving racial segregation. Yet the legality
of claims and conduct is a traditional subject for judicial determina-
tion. Adjudication is often perplexing and complicated. An example
of the extreme complexity of the task can be seen in a decree appor-
tioning water among the several States. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 665. The constitutional guide is often vague, as the deci-
sions under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses show. The prob-
lem under the Equal Protection Clause is no more intricate.226
That having been said, Justice Douglas appeared untroubled by the
refusal or failure of the Court to devise a remedy but simply to remand
the case to the District Court. He clearly thought that establishing the
justiciability of the claims was the major concern, concluding that "[t]he
221. See id. at 244-49.
222. Id. at 245-50.
223. Id. at 244-45.
224. Id. at 247 (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884)).
Justice Douglas was addressing Justice Frankfurter's claim in his dissent that these historic voting-
rights cases had no bearing on redistricting and that they dealt only with fraud and violence in
elections. See id. at 266-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
225. Baker, 369 U.S. at 249 (citing Terry, 345 U.S. at 461; Smith, 321 U.S. at 649; United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)).
226. Baker, 369 U.S. at 245.
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justiciability of the present claims being established, any relief accorded
can be fashioned in the light of well-known principles of equity." '227 He
noted that prior dispositions of apportionment cases suggested that he
foresaw remedies based on "substantial equality" that eliminated "egre-
gious injustices. 2
2 8
Justice Clark wrote a separate concurring opinion229to press the
argument that "an appropriate remedy may be formulated. 230 Calling
the Tennessee apportionment "a topsy-turvical of gigantic proportions,"
and "a crazy quilt without rational basis,"2 3' Justice Clark attached
charts of each county in the state and the effect of his plan contrasted
with Justice Harlan's plan, which Justice Harlan claimed proved that
continuing inequality was unavoidable.232 As had Justice Douglas, Jus-
tice Clark took the position that "mathematical equality among voters is
required by the Equal Protection Clause. '233 Justice Clark found that
"certainly there must be some rational design to a State's districting. ' 234
Justice Clark, alone among the justices, pointed out that alternative to
judicial action as a means of relief from invidious discrimination. 235
Justice Clark concluded his concurring opinion with an analysis of
constitutive voting and the role of equality of representation in it.236 He
227. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas reasoned that "[w]ith the exceptions of
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549; MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281; South v. Peters, 339 U.S.
276, and the decisions they spawned, the Court has never through that protection of voting rights
was beyond judicial cognizance. Today's treatment of those cases removes the only impediment
to judicial cognizance of the claims stated in the present complaint." Id. at 249-50.
228. Id. at 250, n.5.
229. Id. at 251-64 (Clark, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 251.
231. Id. at 254.
232. Id. at 262-64.
233. Id. at 258.
234. Id. at 258.
235. Id. at 258-59. Justice Clark summarized the situation in which the people of Tennessee
found themselves:
Tennessee has an "informed, civically militant electorate" and "an aroused popular
conscience," but it does not sear "the conscience of the people's representatives."
This is because the legislative policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to
their respective constituencies, and by the votes of their incumbents a
reapportionment of any kind is prevented. The people have been rebuffed at the
hands of the Assembly; they have tried the constitutional convention route, but since
the call must originate in the Assembly it, too, has been fruitless. They have tried
Tennessee courts with the same result, and Governors have fought the tide only to
flounder. It is said that there is recourse in Congress and perhaps that may be, but
from a practical standpoint this is without substance. To date Congress has never
undertaken such a task in any State. We therefore must conclude that the people of
Tennessee are stymied and without judicial intervention will be saddled with the
present discrimination in the affairs of their state government.
Id. at 259 (footnote omitted).
236. Id. at 260-62
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thereby placed this case and the issue of equal representation in the his-
tory of the Court's protection of the constitutional value of democratic
government, stating:
As John Rutledge (later Chief Justice) said 175 years ago in the
course of the Constitutional Convention, a chief function of the Court
is to secure the national rights. Its decision today supports the pro-
position for which our forebears fought and many died, namely, that
to be fully conformable to the principle of right, the form of govern-
ment must be representative. That is the keystone upon which our
government was founded and lacking which no republic can survive.
It is well for this Court to practice self-restraint and discipline in con-
stitutional adjudication, but never in its history have those principles
received sanction where the national rights of so many have been so
clearly infringed for so long a time. National respect for the courts is
more enhanced through the forthright enforcement of those rights
rather than by rendering them nugatory through the interposition of
subterfuges. In my view the ultimate decision today is in the greatest
tradition of this Court.23 7
Justice Frankfurter's passionate dissent rejected the majority's
linkage between population and representation and found this linkage "a
wholly different matter from denial of the franchise to individuals
because of race, color, religion or sex." '23 8 He accused the majority of
"asserting destructively novel judicial power," that could well under-
mine the Court's authority.239 He dismissed the majority opinion as "[a]
hypothetical claim resting on abstract assumptions ... affording illusory
relief."24 The immediate result was to lead the lower federal courts into
a "mathematical quagmire" without "accepted legal standards or criteria
or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial
judgments."24'
237. Id. at 261-62 (footnote omitted).
238. Id. at 267.
239. Id. Justice Frankfurter reasoned:
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's "judicial Power"
not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially political
conflict of forces by which the relation between population and representation has
time out of mind been and now is determined. It may well impair the Court's
position as the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range
of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court
must pronounce. The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in
appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into
the clash of political forces in political settlements.
Id. at 267.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 268.
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To Justice Frankfurter, vote dilution was a political question, not
because it dealt with elections or voting but because he saw vote dilution
as a "Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label." '42
What was at issue, according to Justice Frankfurter, was the structure of
a state's chosen means of representation, a question he argued was not a
question of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment but a
question of the guarantee of a republican form of government under sec-
tion 4 of Article IV. Justice Frankfurter reasoned:
What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment? Appellants
invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are
permitted to vote and their votes are counted. They go to the polls,
they cast their ballots, they send their representatives to the state
councils. Their complaint is simply that the representatives are not
sufficiently numerous or powerful-in short, that Tennessee has
adopted a basis of representation with which they are dissatisfied.
Talk of "debasement" or "dilution" is circular talk. One cannot speak
of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of a vote until there is first
defined a standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth.
What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among
competing bases of representation-ultimately, really, among com-
peting theories of political philosophy-in order to establish an
appropriate frame of government for the State of Tennessee and
thereby for all the States of the Union.243
To Justice Frankfurter, "to divorce 'equal protection' from 'Republican
Form' is to talk about half a question. 244 This was not, in Justice Frank-
furter's view, an appropriate task for the judicial branch.245
Justice Harlan, who joined Justice Frankfurter's dissent, wrote a
separate dissent, which Justice Frankfurter joined, focused on the right
of a state to consider multiple factors in defining the representation in its
state legislature.246 Observing that "what lies at the core of this contro-
versy is a difference of opinion as to the function of representative gov-
ernment," Justice Harlan concluded that "[i]t is surely beyond argument
that those who have the responsibility for devising a system of represen-
tation may permissibly consider that factors other than bare numbers
should be taken into account. '247 Justice Harlan, too, expressed concern
about the role of the Court, calling the majority opinion "an adventure in
242. Id. at 297.
243. Id. at 299-300.
244. Id. at 301.
245. Id. at 323-24.
246. Id. at 332-34.
247. Id. at 333.
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judicial experimentation. ' 48
Baker v. Carr and its progeny cited both the post-Civil War vot-
ing-rights cases and the White Primary cases in their linkage between
voting rights and democracy. In Gray v. Sanders, Justice Douglas wrote
for the majority that "[t]he concept of 'we the people' under the Consti-
tution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those
who meet the basic qualifications. ' 249 The majority cited the post-Civil
War cases and the White Primary Cases in support of this analysis.
250
The majority concluded that "[t]he conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing-one person, one vote."25' In his dissent Justice Harlan, citing
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr, rejected the concept of
one person, one vote.
252
Justice Black, writing for the majority in Wesberry v. Sanders,
responded to Justice Harlan by attributing to the Framers a concern with
vote equality 3.25  The majority interpreted vote equality in structural
terms as an integral element of democratic government:
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art.
I, s 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several
States" means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. This rule
followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen
as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the
first 50 years of our Nation's history .... We do not believe that the
Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting
discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts con-
taining widely varyied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is
worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter
to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast
248. Id. at 339. This kind of experimentation was, in Justice Harlan's view, inconsistent with
the role of the courts. He predicted that:
Those observers of the Court who see it primarily as the last refuge for the
correction of all inequality or injustice, no matter what its nature or source, will no
doubt applaud this decision and its break with the past. Those who consider that
continuing national respect for the Court's authority depends in large measure upon
its wise exercise of self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication, will
view the decision with deep concern.
Id. at 339-40.
249. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963) (county unit system as a basis for counting
votes in a primary election for U.S. Senator and statewide offices violated the Equal Protection
clause).
250. Id. at 379-81.
251. Id. at 381.
252. Id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissent).
253. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1964) (congressional districts in Georgia).
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aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected by "the Peo-
ple," a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Consti-
tutional Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that
part of it relating to the adoption of Art. I, s. 2, reveals that those who
framed the Constitution meant that, no matter what the mechanics of
an election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population which
was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.254
Here, too, the majority cited post-Civil War cases and White Pri-
mary Cases in support of the concept of equality in voting and a rejec-
tion of vote dilution.255 The majority in Wesberry v. Sanders understood
the concept of one person, one vote as an element of constitutive voting
at the core of legitimate government.
Although the contemporary legacy of the seminal antidilution cases
has become focused on comparisons between districts and has tended to
consider voting primarily in terms of the rights of individuals voters,
recapturing the structural concept of voting equality is part of crafting a
concept of constitutive voting. Baker v. Carr made questions of the sig-
nificance and salience of each vote a core element of the concept of
constitutive voting.
III. ARE PRIMARIES ELECTIONS?
The antidilution cases involved both general elections and prima-
ries. The White Primary cases addressed the issue of whether primaries
are elections or whether they are simply a procedure for determining
intraparty preferences. Before this issue was resolved in United States v.
Classic, the Court's embrace of formalistic proceduralism in Condon
and Grovey created uncertainty and confusion that resulted in a decision
that threatened to deprive African-Americans of the right to vote in
primaries.256
In 1921, before it began hearing the White Primary Cases, the
Court heard a campaign-finance case in which it held that primaries are
not elections that support Congressional authority to intervene.2 5 ' The
Court held that primaries were "unknown" when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified and "[m]oreover, they are in no sense elections for
an office but merely methods by which party adherents agree upon can-
didates whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate choice by all
qualified voters. 258 The Court held that "[g]eneral provisions touching
254. Id. at 7-9 (footnotes omitted).
255. Id. at 17-18.
256. See supra Part ll.B.
257. Newberry v. U.S., 256 U.S. 232 (1921) (considering whether the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1910 applied to primary elections and holding that it did not).
258. Id. at 250.
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elections in Constitutions or statutes are not necessarily applicable to
primaries-the two things are radically different. '259 The White Primary
Cases, over time, reversed this result and the reasoning on which it was
based. The first of the White Primary cases, Nixon v. Herndon, treated a
"primary election that may determine the final result" as the equivalent
of a "final election. ' 26' This concept provided the analytical framework
for understanding the significance of primary elections in structural con-
stitutional terms and enabled the Court to put substance over form in
protecting the concept of consent at the heart of the Constitution.
The next case, Nixon v. Condon, was brought by the same plaintiff
who challenged the Texas Democratic Party's response to Nixon v.
Herndon.26' The Court held that the next case was controlled by
Herndon, although the Court focused on the narrow procedural issue of
whether the Executive Committee of the party could make a determina-
tion excluding African-Americans registered as Democrats from party
membership for purposes of determining eligibility to vote in party
primaries.2 62 In adopting this procedural minimalism as the basis for its
opinion, the Court provided the Texas Democratic Party invaluable gui-
dance for excluding African-Americans who were registered Democrats
from the right to vote in the Democratic Party primary for federal
offices. This approach illustrates the shifting balances between form and
substance in the ensuing cases.
It should have been no surprise that the Texas Democratic Party
promptly followed this advice. 63 The State Convention declared Afri-
can-American voters who were otherwise eligible to vote ineligible for
membership in the Texas Democratic Party. It is perhaps not surprising
but certainly disappointing that the Court upheld this approach. In
explaining its position in Grovey v. Townsend, the Court found that "the
primary is a party primary" 264 and then blended the concept of a primary
as purely party activity with the concept of a political party as a private
259. Id.
260. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
261. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932).
262. Id. at 83-84.
263. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 46 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944).
264. Id. at 50. The Court reasoned:
While it is true that Texas has by its laws elaborately provided for the expression of
party preference as to nominees, has required that preference to be expressed in a
certain form of voting, and has attempted in minute detail to protect the suffrage of
the members of the organization against fraud, it is equally true that the primary is a
party primary; the expenses of it are not borne by the state, but by members of the
party seeking nomination; the ballots are furnished not by the state, but by the
agencies of the party; the votes are counted and the returns made by
instrumentalities created by the party; and the state recognizes the state convention
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association. The Court noted that the complaint stated that the primary
election determines who will hold federal office because "nomination by
the Democratic party is equivalent to election. ' 65 The Court dismissed
this claim in the following terms:
The argument is that as a negro may not be denied a ballot at a gen-
eral election on account of his race or color, if exclusion from the
primary renders his vote at the general election insignificant and use-
less, the result is to deny him the suffrage altogether. So to say is to
confuse the privilege of membership in a party with the right to vote
for one who is to hold a public office. With the former the state need
have no concern, with the latter it is bound to concern itself, for the
general election is a function of the state government and discrimina-
tion by the state as respects participation by negroes on account of
their race or color is prohibited by the Federal Constitution.266
In blending its distinction between primary and general elections with
the concept of a political party as a private association, the Court began
to lay the groundwork for subsequent claims that the rights of political
parties took precedence over the rights of voters.
This distinction between primary elections and general elections
endured for six years. The Court in United States v. Classic upheld "the
right of the voters at the primary to have their votes counted. '2 67 The
Court emphasized the fundamental nature of the right of the people to
choose their representative, finding this right part of the constitutional
structure and one of the purposes of the Constitution.2 68 The Court held
that:
[u]nless the constitutional protection of the integrity of "elections"
extends to primary elections, Congress is left powerless to effect the
constitutional purpose, and the popular choice of representatives is
stripped of its constitutional protection save only as Congress, by tak-
ing over the control of state elections, may exclude from them the
influence of the state primaries.269
The Court did not limit constitutional protection of voting only if the
primary determined the outcome of the general election but extended
very broadly, stating:
Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the
procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls
as the organ of the party for the declaration of principles and the formulation of
policies.
Id. (citations omitted).
265. Id. at 54.
266. Id. at 54-55.
267. Id. at 54.
268. Id. at 54-55.
269. Classic, 313 U.S. at 319 (footnote omitted).
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the choice, the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the
primary is likewise included in the right protected by Article I, § 2.
And this right of participation is protected just as is the right to vote
at the election ...whether the voter exercises his right in a party
primary which invariably, sometimes or never determines the ulti-
mate choice of the representative.27°
The Court addressed the inconsistency between Classic and Grovey
three years later in Smith v. Allwright, where the Court took the position
that "[i]t may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a
primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the
State, like the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the
Constitution. 2 7 1 It expressly overruled Grovey v. Townsend.2 72 As is
discussed in the following section of the article, the Court then
addressed the next issue, namely, the question of whether a political
party is a private association and the implications of the possible
responses to that question for determining whether, how, or to what
extent voters' rights are protected by the Constitution.273
The last of the White Primary cases, Terry v. Adams, treated elec-
tions as processes that may consist of several steps that are discrete in
form but not in substance. 274 The Court held that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment applied to "any election in which public issues are decided or pub-
lic officials selected. ' 275 The Court held that the preference vote held by
the Jaybird Association was "an integral part" of the election process
276
and concluded that "[t]he effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird primary
plus Democratic primary plus general election, is to do precisely that
which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids-strip Negroes of every vestige
of influence in selecting the officials who control the local county mat-
ters that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens. 277
Much of the controversy in Terry v. Adams centered on the state-
action question. Because the election at issue here was an election for
county offices, the state action question became much more central here
than it was in the cases dealing with primary elections for federal office,
which relied on Article I, Sections 2 and 4, which did not raise the state-
action issue. Much of the academic criticism of Terry v. Adams, and, by
extension, the other White Primary cases, is based on concern about the
270. Id. at 318.
271. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944).
272. Id. at 666.
273. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462-63 (1953).
274. See id. at 468-70.
275. Id. at 468.
276. Id. at 469.
277. Id. at 469-70.
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low threshold for finding state action. The majority took the position
that state action arose based on the relationship among the Jaybird pri-
mary, the formal Democratic Party primary, and the general election. 78
The Court held that, given these relationships, "[ilt is immaterial that the
state does not control that part of this elective process which it leaves for
the Jaybirds to manage. '279 The concurring opinions took issue with the
scope of this analysis,28 ° while the dissent rejected it.
28'
The Florida primary was, of course, a presidential primary, and it
raised the issue of disregarding all votes, not discrimination based on
race, nationality, or gender. The state-action dispute is relevant to due
process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not to claims
under Article I, Sections 2 and 4.
The controversy over state action has receded as the Court has
turned to the question of whether political parties are private associa-
tions with First Amendment rights. This claim emerged in two phases.
The initial phase focused on whether political parties are private associa-
tions.282 The second phase focused on rights of association claims that
can be raised by the organization even when this claim limits the claims
of association that can be raised by members of the association.283
IV. POLITICAL PARTIES' ASSOCIATIONAL CLAIMS
While the Court has recognized a right of association, it has not
developed a stable or coherent jurisprudence related to that right. Indeed,
very little is settled with respect to association as a constitutionally pro-
tected right. This article does not purport to offer a theory of association
or a comprehensive conceptual framework for analyzing claims arising
from the right of association. The aims here are more modest but still
daunting-to understand what associational claims parties have made,
whether these claims are made in the name of the party entity or the
party members or both, and the implications of these various approaches
to association for voting rights.
While the Constitution does not refer expressly to a right of associ-
278. See id. at 469.
279. Id.
280. Justice Frankfurter agreed, rather tentatively and reluctantly, that "the State authority has
come into play," id. at 475, but he took the position that the federal courts had no authority to
devise and impose a remedy. See id. at 477. Justice Clark's concurrence took the position that "the
Jaybird Democratic Association operates as part and parcel of the Democratic Party, an
organization existing under the auspices of Texas law." Id. at 482 (Clark, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
281. In his dissent, Justice Minton claimed that the majority had no constitutional basis for
finding state action in this case. See id. at 484-94 (Minton, J., dissenting).
282. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
283. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.
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ation and does not use the words association or associate, the Court has
long recognized that the reference in the First Amendment to the right to
"peaceably assemble" encompasses a much broader right to associate.
Indeed, the Court has recognized that a right to associate in order to
exercise such other constitutionally protected rights as speech is not only
necessary but also so fundamental that the right to associate is inherent
in these other rights.
Political parties have asserted two distinct but interrelated associa-
tional claims. The first was the claim that political parties are private
associations that cannot be regulated by the government under the state-
action doctrine. This claim emerged from the White Primary Cases
where political parties were asserting their status as private associations
to protect their rules and procedures designed to exclude African-Ameri-
can voters from participating in primary elections. Over time, the claim
that political parties are private associations became a claim under the
First Amendment right of association that was controlled exclusively by
party managers as an association right of the party, not a right that
involved associational rights of members. The second claim was a more
powerful claim under the First Amendment, a claim that political parties
have a right to exclude voters based on a right of expressive association.
This right of expressive association has been relied upon by the Court to
uphold discrimination against persons that an organization claims are
inconsistent with its image and message and to prohibit various types of
primaries in which voters may vote for any candidate from any party for
any office. In the 2008 Florida primaries, the national party committees
negated the votes of persons who shared the ideals of the party to the
extent that they registered as members of their respective parties.
Taken together, the claims under the First Amendment that political
parties are private associations with their own First Amendment rights
and the claim under the First Amendment that political parties are
expressive associations that can exclude whomever the party managers
choose provide a powerful but misguided basis for negating the votes of
primary voters. Both are doctrines of voter exclusion that conflict funda-
mentally with both the right to vote and the concept of voting as a struc-
tural element of the Constitution. The private-association claims remain
important because they apply to cases in which the only issue is the
primacy of party managers whatever the issue. These claims by party
managers could potentially be limited by treating various activities of
party managers as subject to greater or lesser constitutional protection.
The expressive-association claims are not subject to such limitations
because they are claims that the entire identity of the party is threatened.
These two types of First Amendment claims are now in the process of
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being blended into a claim that party managers are not accountable to
either voters or party members.
A. Political Parties as Private Associations
The claims in the White Primary Cases were based on the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which meant that questions of state
action were part of the deliberations. These cases were brought by voters
against political parties, party managers, and election officials. Political
parties claimed that they were private associations and thus not subject
to claims brought under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments with
their state-action requirement. In the second phase of its development,
the claim that political parties are private associations was brought by
the political parties under the First Amendment as a defense against
action by the state. In this second phase, voters were not parties to the
litigation and little attention was given to voting or to elections.
1. PARTIES AS PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS: THE WHITE PRIMARY CASES
The issue of whether political parties were private associations for
purposes of the state-action doctrine is present in all of the White Pri-
mary cases because only state action was subject to regulation under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The first of the White Primary
cases, Nixon v. Herndon, presented a clear instance of state action
because an African-American doctor who was a member of the Demo-
cratic Party and a qualified voter had been denied the right to vote in a
Democratic Party primary for state and federal offices pursuant to a state
statute.284 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes found that
"[w]e find it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because
it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of
the Fourteenth. 285
The Court faced an only slightly more difficult issue in the second
White Primary case, Nixon v. Condon.8 6 In response to the Court's
decision in Nixon v. Herndon, the Texas legislature had enacted on an
emergency basis a statute providing that a political party's executive
committee had the authority to determine party membership, which, in
turn, determined who could vote in the party's primary.281 It was no
284. 273 U.S. 536, 537 (1927). See supra Part Il.B.
285. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540-41.
286. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
287. Id. at 82. The new statute provided that
every political party in this State through its State Executive Committee shall have
the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own
way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such
political party; provided that no person shall ever be denied the right to participate
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surprise that the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party
promptly adopted a resolution providing that "'all white democrats who
are qualified under the constitution and laws of Texas"' would be per-
mitted to vote in the party primary.288
The arguments of the petitioner and respondent in Nixon v. Condon
addressed the core issue of whether a political party had inherent author-
ity apart from the state statute to determine its own membership or
whether the party depended on the state for statutory authority to deter-
mine its membership.2 89 This was an argument over state action in the
guise of an argument over the relationship between the party and the
state government. While the Court identified the Fourteenth Amendment
as the constitutional predicate for its decision, it did so only in the last
sentence and then without any reference to state action.
The petitioner, Dr. Nixon, argued that he had been denied the right
to vote in the Democratic Party primary solely on the basis of race and
that this action violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 290 The petitioner
argued that several provisions of Texas election law were inconsistent
with claims that political parties are purely private association but that
"parties and their representatives have become the custodians of official
power."'2 9 ' The Court characterized the petitioner's argument regarding
political parties as claiming that "if heed is to be given to the realities of
political life, they are now agencies of the State, the instruments by
which government becomes a living thing. 292 The Court concluded its
paraphrase of the petitioner's argument in terms that echo in the argu-
ments over expressive association: "In that view, so runs the argument, a
party is still free to define for itself the political tenets of its members,
but to those who profess its tenets there may be no denial of its
privileges."293
The respondents claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
apply to private associations and that the Democratic Party of Texas was
a private association. 29' As summarized by the Court, respondents
developed this argument in the following terms:
in a primary in this State because of former political views or affiliations or because
of membership or non-membership in organizations other than the political party.
Id.
288. Id. at 82.
289. Id. at 83-84.
290. Id. at 83.
291. Id. at 84.
292. Id.
293. Id. The dispute over expressive association is whether the authority to determine the
characteristics of participants apart from sharing the party's beliefs is part of the right of
expressive association. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
294. Id. at 83.
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This line of demarcation drawn, we are told that a political party is
merely a voluntary association; that it has inherent power like volun-
tary associations generally to determine its own membership; that the
new article of the statute, adopted in place of the mandatory article of
exclusion condemned by this court, has no other effect than to restore
to the members of the party the power that would have been theirs if
the lawmakers had been silent; and that qualifications thus estab-
lished are as far aloof from the impact of constitutional restraint as
those for membership in a golf club or for admission to a Masonic
lodge.
295
These arguments resonate in contemporary controversies taking place
far removed from the historic controversies over the state-action doc-
trine. Controversies over the implications for voting, elections, and
democracy are now taking under the First Amendment, which, like state
action in the White Primary Cases, is being used as a grounds for deny-
ing both voters' rights and claims of the constitutional significance of
voting.
The Court in Nixon v. Condon chose quite deliberately to decide the
case on procedural grounds. The reasons for this choice are not
explained by the Court's reasoning in the case. The Court sidestepped
the respondent's argument that a political party is simply a voluntary
association like any other voluntary association with the observation that
"[w]hether a political party in Texas has inherent power today without
restraint by any law to determine its own membership, we are not
required at this time to either affirm or to deny. '2 96 In response to the
petitioner's argument that a political party is an agency of the state, the
Court found that "[a] narrower base will serve for our judgment in the
cause at hand." '2 97 Indeed, the Court was careful to explain that it was
not following the petitioner's reasoning with respect to the transforma-
tion of a political party from a voluntary association to a state agency.298
The Court based its decision on the state's delegation of authority to
determine party membership to the state party executive committee. The
Court held that this authority rested exclusively in the state party con-
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 84.
298. Id. The Court stated:
the effect of Texas legislation has been to work so complete a transformation of the
concept of a political party as a voluntary association, we do not now decide.
Nothing in this opinion is to be taken as carrying with it an intimation that the court
is ready or unready to follow the petitioner so far. As to that, decision must be
postponed until decision becomes necessary.
Id. Whether the Court has yet decided this issue or whether it has become necessary for the Court
to do so remains a matter of some considerable dispute, but that dispute is no longer directly
framed by the historic dimensions of the state-action doctrine.
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vention, not in the party executive committee.299 Because the Court
found that this delegation of authority to the state executive committee
was not consistent with the operating rules of the party and because the
state convention had never enacted a resolution to bar African-Ameri-
cans who were otherwise qualified to vote from voting in the state party
primary, the state executive committee had acted solely on the basis of
authority delegated by the state, not on the basis of any inherent author-
ity it may have had. 3° The Court held that "[w]hatever power of exclu-
sion has been exercised by the members of the committee has come to
them, therefore, not as the delegates of the party, but as the delegates of
the State."30 1 The Court made it clear that it did not question the author-
ity of the state legislature to delegate authority to the state party execu-
tive committee. 30 2 The Court focused solely on the political party that
had been the subject of the legislation and reasoned as follows:
The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those agencies are
invested with an authority independent of the will of the association
in whose name they undertake to speak, they become to that extent
the organs of the State itself, the repositories of official power. They
are then the governmental instruments whereby parties are organized
and regulated to the end that government itself may be established or
continued. What they do in that relation, they must do in submission
to the mandates of equality and liberty that bind officials everywhere.
They are not acting in matters of merely private concern like the
directors or agents of business corporations. They are acting in mat-
ters of high public interest, matters intimately connected with the
capacity of government to exercise its functions unbrokenly and
smoothly.
30 3
The emphasis on the will of the party alluded to here was the will of the
state party convention, but the Court did not link this line of reasoning to
any concept of the rights of party members to vote for convention dele-
gates. The Court did not advance a concept of participatory association
but relied instead on the relation between the respective roles of the
executive committee and the convention as set forth in the party rules.
This narrow procedural ground for a voting-rights decision took voting
off the table and opened the way not only for the next move by the State
of Texas and its Democratic Party but also for much later cases that
turned on the rights of party managers to claim exclusive rights to decide
what votes are counted.
299. Id. at 84-85.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 85.
302. Id. at 88.
303. Id.
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The dissent exposed the limitations of the majority's reasoning. 3°4
The dissent argued that the state statute did not discriminate against
African-Americans on its face, unlike the state statute at issue in Nixon
v. Herndon.3 °5 In addition, a primary election in Texas, according to the
dissent, is a party activity financed by the political party and conducted
under party rules.3 °6 The dissent concluded that "[p]olitical parties are
fruits of voluntary action. '30 7 As such, the dissent took the position that
the state statute "refrained from interference with the essential liberty of
party associations and recognized their general power to define member-
ship therein. '30 8 This issue echoes in the expressive association cases in
which party associational rights have become the rationale for permit-
ting invidious exclusions. The result of adopting the dissent's reasoning
here would have been to deny an otherwise qualified African-American
voter the right to vote. The dissent did not address this element of its
reasoning or the constitutional predicate that would have provided for
such an outcome. Instead, the dissent confined its reasoning to the lack
of facially discriminatory language in the state statute and the rights of a
political party. In this sense, the dissent foreshadows the controversies
surrounding the expressive association jurisprudence of our own day.
In Grovey v. Townsend the Court held that an African-American
who was qualified to vote in the state party primary except for his race,
could be constitutionally denied a ballot for the primary election simply
because the exclusionary policy had been adopted by the state party con-
vention.309 The Court declared that "[w]e are not prepared to hold that in
Texas the state convention of a party has become a mere instrumentality
or agency for expressing the voice or will of the state." 310The petitioner
claimed that the national Democratic Party had never adopted a policy
excluding African-Americans. 31 'The Court dismissed this claim on
grounds that it was irrelevant to the question of whether the State of
Texas had discriminated against African-American voters but instead "it
assumes merely that a state convention, the representative and agent of a
304. Id. at 89-106. The dissent was written by Justice McReynolds, joined by Justice
VanDevanter, Justice Sutherland, and Justice Butler. Id. at 89 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 94.
306. Id. at 96-104.
307. Id. at 104. The dissent described the operational implications of this characterization of a
political party as a voluntary association in the following terms: "Where there is no unlawful
purpose, citizens may create them at will and limit their membership as seems wise. The State
may not interfere. White men may organize; blacks may do likewise. A woman's party may
exclude males. This much is essential to free government." Id.
308. Id. at 105.
309. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
310. Id. at 54.
311. Id. at 55.
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state association, has usurped the rightful authority of a national conven-
tion which represents a larger and superior country-wide association. 312
The Court found no reason to consider this case, which later became a
central issue in the cases in which political-party national committees
claimed that they were private associations with associational rights
under the First Amendment, even when state committees or state con-
ventions or state primaries had reached a different result.
3 1 3
Grovey represents the conceptual sterility of the formalist
proceduralism that the Court embraced in Condon. The result was that
the Court found no countervailing interest to the claims of political par-
ties that they were private associations and that party primaries were not
elections. The unanimous opinion in Grovey made virtually no reference
to any constitutional predicate. There is no better example than Grovey
of the negative consequences of a failure or refusal to consider both the
rights of voters and the role of voting as an element of constitutional
structure.
The Court began to change course in United States v. Classic.3 14
Unlike the prior White Primary cases, this was a case brought by the
United States alleging violation of criminal statutes defining criminal
sanctions for violation of the duty to count duly cast votes. In this
respect, Classic looked back to the post-Civil War cases which also
involved federal statutes imposing criminal penalties for interfering with
the right to vote.315 The constitutional predicates in Classic as in these
earlier cases were sections 2 and 4 of Article I, which did not involve
state-action limitations. Because state action was not at issue, the ques-
tion of whether political parties are public entities or private associations
was not at issue. Nevertheless, Classic was an important case in address-
ing this issue in the two remaining White Primary cases.
The Court expressly overruled Grovey in Smith v. Allwright.3 t6 An
individual African-American citizen was denied the right to vote in a
primary election solely because of his race. The Court held that Article I,
section 4, authorized Congress to regulate both primary and general
elections 3 7 and that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments protected
voters from discrimination on the basis of race. In so ruling, the Court
held that treating the political party that played a role, however substan-
tial, in organizing the primary election, did not deprive voters of the
protection provided in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
312. Id.
313. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
314. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
315. For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.A.
316. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
317. For a discussion of this part of the holding, see supra Part III.
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The Court in Smith v. Allwright held that "[p]rimary elections are
conducted by the party under state statutory authority."3 '8 The Court
reasoned:
We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nomi-
nees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes the party
which is required to follow these legislative directions an agency of
the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary elec-
tion. The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties
imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of
private law because they are performed by a political party.319
The Court made it clear that it reached this conclusion based on the role
of voting in the constitutional structure. Any characterization of a politi-
cal party as a private association cannot be relied upon to sustain dis-
crimination in the context of voting. The Court reasoned:
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law
grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected
officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant
to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a
State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a
private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election.
Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus
indirectly denied.32°
The Court observed that "[tihe privilege of membership in a party may
be, as this Court said in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55, no con-
cern of the State. But when, as here, that privilege is also the essential
qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general
election, the State makes the action of the party the action of the
State. '3 21 The Court held:
Here we are applying, contrary to the recent decision in Grovey v.
Townsend, the well-established principle of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, forbidding the abridgement by a State of a citizen's right to
vote. Grovey v. Townsend is overruled.
3 22
Smith v. Allwright put voting rights and protection afforded the right to
vote at the center of any election-law case involving either a primary or
a general election. Any claim that a political party is a private associa-
tion cannot be used as the constitutional predicate for denying the right
to vote.
The dissent by Justice Roberts referred in passing to the Court's
318. Smith, 321 U.S. at 663.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 664.
321. Id. at 664-65.
322. Id. at 666.
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refusal in Nixon v. Herndon to decide whether a political party had the
authority, apart from the state statute at issue in that case, to determine
its membership and used that as the basis for the Court's unanimous
opinion in Grovey.
323
Terry v. Adams involved an organization, the Jaybird Association,
which might appear to be a private association but which the Court held
was engaged in the same activities as a political party.3 24 The Court
found that it did not need to decide whether the Jaybird Association was
a political party on essentialist grounds but that it could resolve the case
by determining whether the voting in the Jaybird Association deter-
mined the result of the Democratic Party primary. 32 5 This functional
approach marked the end of direct claims that political parties are pri-
vate association on essentialist grounds and the beginning of the turn to
finding a constitutional predicate for very similar claims in the First
Amendment.
2. PARTIES AS PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS: FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
The cases raising claims by political parties that they are private
associations for purposes of the First Amendment rights of speech and
association are distinguished from the White Primary cases by their con-
sequences for voting rights. While the White Primary Cases protected
voting rights, the contemporary First Amendment claims of political par-
ties have protected only the unfettered discretion of political party man-
agers and, in the process, have repeatedly negated voters rights and the
significance of voting. The result has been a jurisprudence that has come
very close to treating primary elections as private activities by private
associations. Indeed, the Court has never squarely faced the conceptual
issues of treating primaries as public activities of private associations.
Although the Court has come to conflate registering to vote as a member
of a particular party with party membership for purposes that do not
involve voting, it has not developed a concept of party membership and
has not found any constitutional significance in the absence of such a
concept. The concept of a political party has become coterminous with
party managers.
It is perhaps not surprising that the Court was receptive to the
claims of political parties in an era of sociocultural turmoil based on
renewed claims to civil rights by African-Americans and women, oppo-
323. Id. at 667-68 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts' main argument was based on the
need to preserve continuity in judicial decisions. See discussion supra Part 11.B.
324. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). For a more detailed discussion of the facts in this
case, see discussion supra Part I.B.
325. Terry, 345 U.S. at 474-75.
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sition to an unpopular war, and dismissal of cultural constraints in per-
sonal lives that seemed to have survived longer than was rational. The
result was a pervasive challenge to the prevailing order of things and to
the people who made and benefited from that order. The members of the
Court were not in the forefront of this new sociocultural assertion. While
the justices understood African-Americans' claims as having a firm con-
stitutional basis, they struggled with the claims of newly assertive
women who were not at all content, even though they had been given the
right to vote, and with the claims of young people in general for a politi-
cal system that would not send them to needless wars abroad and limit
their lives to the old order at home. In this milieu, political parties
seemed like forces for order and stability, and the Court reacted accord-
ingly by upholding the associational claims of parties as associations but
not the claims of individuals to a right to associate.
The foundational case in the development of the use of the First
Amendment is Cousins v. Wigoda, which presented a fact pattern that
inverts the facts in the White Primary cases.326 Here, the party national
committee wanted to increase diversity among the delegates to the
party's national convention, while the Illinois primary produced a slate
of delegates controlled by the Daley machine in Chicago.3 27 The legal
issue was whether the party national committee rules or the Illinois state
statute controlled the determination of which Illinois delegation would
be seated.328 The case thus presented a clash of two constitutionally pro-
tected values-voting rights and equal protection. The case was decided
by the Supreme Court three years after the party's 1972 national conven-
tion329 at which the party had seated the Cousins delegates, reflecting the
national committee's rules rather than the Wigoda delegates elected by
the primary voters and representing the Daley political machine in Chi-
cago. 33 ° The party national committee seated the Cousins delegates
despite an injunction issued by the Illinois Circuit Court two days before
the convention and subsequently upheld by the Illinois Appellate
Court.3 3 ' In its opinion, the Illinois Appellate Court held that "[the] right
to sit as a delegate representing Illinois at the national nominating con-
vention is governed exclusively by the Illinois Election Code.133 2 The
Illinois Appellate Court also held that "the law of the state is supreme
326. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
327. Id. at 478-80.
328. Id. at 483.
329. This was the 1972 Democratic National Convention held in Miami, which followed the
tumultuous 1968 Democratic Convention held in Chicago, which featured a violent confrontation
between protesters and Chicago police.
330. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 478-80.
331. Id. at 481.
332. Wigoda v. Cousins, 302 N.E.2d 614, 626 (II1. App. Ct. 1973), rev'd 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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and party rules to the contrary are of no effect.
333
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to decide the important
question presented [of] whether the Appellate Court was correct in
according primacy to state law over the National Political Party's rules
in the determination of the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to
the Party's National Convention." '334 The Court distinguished this ques-
tion from related questions, observing that
There are not before us in this case, and we intimate no views upon
the merits of, such questions as:
(1) whether the decisions of a national political party in the area of
delegate selection constitute state or governmental action, and, if so,
whether or to what extent principles of the political question doctrine
counsel against judicial intervention ....
(2) whether national political parties are subject to the principles of
the reapportionment decisions, or other constitutional restraints, in
their methods of delegate selection and allocation ....
(3) whether or to what extent national political parties and their nomi-
nating conventions are regulable by, or only by, Congress.335
By narrowing the question to exclude the prior cases relating to the
public or private character of elections and by treating nominating con-
ventions apart from voting, the Court shifted its jurisprudence from that
it had set forth in the White Primary cases and moved association to a
right that could be used to denigrate other rights and to redraft the role of
voting in the structure of constitutional legitimacy.
The Court reversed the Illinois court and held that "[t]he National
Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected
right of political association. 3 3 6 The Court never explained why or how
this right resulted in negation of the vote of the participating voters in
the Illinois Democratic primary. Instead, the Court treated voting and
voters' rights as a potential compelling governmental interest rather than
a structural element of the Constitution that sustained a right to cast a
ballot, have that ballot counted, and have the vote count for its stated
purpose, in this case the selection of delegates to the party's national
nominating convention.337 There is a profound difference between ask-
ing whether the conduct of elections is a compelling government interest
that can overcome another right that is, by the structure of the inquiry,
presumed to have primacy, and asking how two rights are to be recon-
333. Id. at 627.
334. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483.
335. Id. at 483-84, n.4 (citations omitted).
336. Id. at 487.
337. Id. at 489.
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ciled under the Constitution when there is no constitutional basis for any
presumption about relative importance.
The Court finessed the entire issue it had set for itself by respond-
ing to the assertion by the State of Illinois as a matter of federalism.338
The Court did not find that protecting the right of voters is not impor-
tant. Instead, it found that protecting the right to vote is too important to
be left to any one state.339 By default, this left the matter in the hands of
the Credential Committee of the Democratic National Committee. The
Court made only the most tenuous First Amendment case for this out-
come and no case at all for its novel interpretation of federalism. The
Court's reasoning deserves to be stated in its own terms:
Respondents argue that Illinois had a compelling interest in protect-
ing the integrity of its electoral processes and the right of its citizens
under the State and Federal Constitutions to effective suffrage. They
rely on the numerous statements of this Court that the right to vote is
a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S., at 31; Kramer v.
Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). But respondents overlook the significant
fact that the suffrage was exercised at the primary election to elect
delegates to a National Party Convention. Consideration of the spe-
cial function of delegates to such a Convention militates persuasively
against the conclusion that the asserted interest constitutes a compel-
ling state interest. Delegates perform a task of supreme importance to
every citizen of the Nation regardless of their State of residence. The
vital business of the Convention is the nomination of the Party's can-
didates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United
States. To that end, the state political parties are "affiliated with a
national party through acceptance of the national call to send state
delegates to the national convention." Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225
(1952). The States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role
in the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates. If the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to
National Political Party Conventions were left to state law "each of
the fifty states could establish the qualifications of its delegates to the
various party conventions without regard to party policy, an obvi-
ously intolerable result." Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 86
(ND I11. 1972). Such a regime could seriously undercut or indeed
destroy the effectiveness of the National Party Convention as a con-
certed enterprise engaged in the vital process of choosing Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates-a process which usually involves
338. Id. at 489-90.
339. Id.
[Vol. 64:535
2010] CONSTITUTIVE VOTING AND PARTICIPATORY ASSOCIATION 601
coalitions cutting across state lines. The Convention serves the perva-
sive national interest in the selection of candidates for national office,
and this national interest is greater than any interest of an individual
State. The paramount necessity for effective performance of the Con-
vention's task is underscored by Mr. Justice Pitney's admonition
"that the likelihood of a candidate succeeding in an election without a
party nomination is practically negligible .... As a practical matter,
the ultimate choice of the mass of voters is predetermined when the
nominations have been made." Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S.
232, 286 (1921) (dissenting opinion).34°
The majority in Cousins v. Wigoda summarized its position as fol-
lows: "Illinois' interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process
cannot be deemed compelling in the context of the selection of delegates
to the National Party Convention. 341 Instead, the Court characterized
the issue as an "intra-party dispute" that is properly resolved within the
party convention. 342 In effect, the majority embraced the minimalism of
the early White Primary cases that reached a constitutionally unsustain-
able position in Grovey v. Townsend.3 4 3 Unlike the Court's rapid retreat
from its untenable position, the idea that a party national convention
takes precedence over the rights of voters persists.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Cousins v. Wigoda
acknowledged the issue, but failed to articulate a framework for address-
ing it. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Berger and Justice
Stewart, observed that the injunction issued by the Illinois Circuit Court
"was as direct and severe an infringement of the right of association as
can be conceived" '344 but then immediately stated that "[w]e would by
no means downplay the legitimacy of the interest of the State in assuring
that delegates to the Party Convention chosen pursuant to its electoral
processes, and presumably representing the view of the majority of the
party's electors in that State, are seated at the Convention. 345 The con-
currence then simply concluded that the state's interest was not "suffi-
cient" to counterbalance the party's right of association. The reason for
writing a concurring opinion was to object to the breadth of the majority
opinion, particularly in its positing a national interest that took prece-
dence over the interest of the states.346 The concurring opinion never
questions whether the role of an ostensibly private association, a politi-
340. Id. (footnotes omitted).
341. Id. at 491.
342. Id. (citing O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972)).
343. See discussion supra Part II.B.
344. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
345. Id. at 492.
346. The concurring opinion states that "the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pickney in
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285 (1921) without more, does not establish for us that
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cal party, or a national convention of a political party, might represent a
national interest that takes precedence over the interest of a state in pro-
tecting the structural constitutional role of its voters.
In his dissent Justice Powell claimed that the National Convention
could have seated the dissenting delegates as at-large delegates but that
it had no authority to seat them as delegates representing districts that
had chosen to be represented by other delegates in the primary elec-
tion.347 This approach to balancing the associational rights of political
parties and party national conventions, the rights of primary voters, and
the rights to states to protect the integrity of primary elections has not
been applied or even considered in subsequent cases or academic analy-
ses. The potentially interesting point here is not Justice Potter's specific
recommendation but his analytical framework that takes account of the
specific rules and procedures of the national convention.
The Court applied Cousins v. Wigoda as the controlling precedent
in a case involving Wisconsin's open primary, which had been state law
since 1903, and the conflict created with National Democratic Commit-
tee rules for delegate selection for the 1980 national convention.348 In
1979 the Wisconsin State Democratic Party submitted its state statute
for review by the Compliance Review Commission of the National
Party, which rejected delegate chosen according to state law.
The Court majority framed the issue in this case in the following
terms:
The question in this case is not whether Wisconsin may conduct an
open primary election if it chooses to do so, or whether the National
Party may require Wisconsin to limits its primary election to publicly
declared Democrats. Rather, the question is whether, once Wisconsin
has opened its Democratic Presidential preference primary to voters
who do not publicly declare their party affiliation, it may then bind
the National Party to honor the binding primary results, even though
those results were reached in a manner contrary to national party
rules.349
there is a 'national interest' which standing alone, apart from valid congressional legislation or
constitutional provision, would override state regulation in this situation." Id. at 495.
347. Id. at 496. Justice Powell reasoned: "The National Convention of the Party may seat
whomever it pleases, including petitioners, as delegates at large. The State of Illinois, on the other
hand, has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from being represented by delegates who
have been rejected by these citizens in a democratic election. Accordingly, I would affirm the
injunctions of the trial court insofar as they barred petitioners from purporting, contrary to Illinois
law, to represent certain election districts of that State." Id. at 497.
348. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). The
Wisconsin statute permitted any registered voter to vote in the primary of any political party and
required delegates chosen in the primary to vote in accordance with the results of the open
primary. Id. at 109-12.
349. Id. at 120.
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The Court was not establishing a constitutional principle based on the
content of the rule. It was rather addressing the question of whether the
state or the national party could define the rule. As the Court stated:
"The issue is whether the State may compel the National Party to seat a
delegation chosen in a way that violates the rules of the Party. '350 The
Court then held that this issue was resolved in Cousins v. Wigoda. This
was the kind of formalistic proceduralism that produced the denial of
voting rights in Grovey.
The dissent by Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun and Jus-
tice Rehnquist, framed the question in the case differently, stating that
"[t]he question in this case is whether, in light of the National Party's
rule that only publicly declared Democrats may have a voice in the nom-
ination process, Wisconsin's open primary law infringes the National
Party's First Amendment rights of association."' 35' The dissent found
that the state statute "does not impose a substantial burden on the associ-
ational freedom of the National Party, and actually promotes the free
political activity of the citizens of Wisconsin. ' 352 Like the majority, the
dissent makes no reference to the reasons for voting. Unlike the major-
ity, the dissent based its reasoning in part on the purpose of primary
elections, namely, to enable ordinary citizens, not party bosses, to con-
trol political parties.3 53 The dissent described the recently enacted
national party rule as having a similar purpose of opening up popular
participation in the party but also noted that the party rule "has the ironic
effect of calling into question a state law that was intended itself to open
up participation in the nominating process and minimize the influence of
'party bosses.'""
Having considered the purpose of Wisconsin's primary-election
statute, it would have seemed logical to consider the importance
attached to voting as a structural element of the Constitution in the
post-Civil War cases and the White Primary cases. The dissent did not
take this logical step. Instead, it followed a conventional First Amend-
ment analysis that first determined whether there was a burden on the
party's associational rights and then considered whether the state could
establish a compelling interest for maintaining its statute. 355 The dissent
provided no evidence of having considered an analytical framework that
would begin with voting and then ask whether the party rule burdened
the role of voting and voters in the constitutional structure. In the end,
350. Id. at 121.
351. Id. at 127 (Powell, J., dissenting).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 127-28.
354. Id. at 128.
355. Id. at 128-38.
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the dissent based its position on a finding that the Wisconsin state statute
involved "relatively minimal state regulation of party membership
requirements. 356 The dissent seemed to understand that the majority
opinion came close to First Amendment absolutism, and rejected the
conclusion that "every conflict between state law and party rules con-
cerning participation in the nomination process creates a burden on asso-
ciational rights. '357 The dissent found that "[t]he history of state
regulation of the major political parties suggests a continuing accommo-
dation of the interests of the parties with those of the State and their
citizens. '3 58 Describing the majority opinion as a departure from this
history of accommodation, the dissent described the majority as
"upholding a First Amendment claim by one of the two major parties
without any serious inquiry into the extent of the burden on associational
freedoms and without due consideration of the countervailing state inter-
ests."35 9 This could have been an analytically powerful dissent if the
dissent had confronted the implications of voting in constitutional struc-
ture. Instead, the dissent referred only in passing to Smith v. Allwright
and Terry v. Adams and did so without any reference to voters or
voting.36°
Subsequent cases treating political parties with First Amendment
associational rights controlled by party managers made it clear that the
Court was protecting the right of party managers to decide and not any
particular decision that they might make. It was also clear that any disa-
greement between state or local party managers and national party man-
agers, the national party managers would prevail. Voters, whether in
their roles as voters or their role as party members, had no associational
rights within their parties. The First Amendment right to associate had
become the right of unaccountable party managers to decide whatever
and however they chose.
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Court held that
the state's enforcement of its closed primary burdened the party's asso-
ciational right by denying it the right to decide to hold an open pri-
mary.36' Republicans had attempted to amend the state statute, but
Democrats controlled the state legislature.3 6' The Republican Party then
356. Id. at 130.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 137.
359. Id. at 138.
360. Id. at 134, n.9 the dissent observes: "It cannot be denied that these parties play a central
role in the electoral process in this country, to a degree that had led this Court on occasion to
impose constitutional limitations on party activities. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)."
361. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
362. Id. at 212-13.
[Vol. 64:535
20101 CONSTITUTIVE VOTING AND PARTICIPATORY ASSOCIATION 605
turned to the federal courts, claiming that the right to decide was part of
its First Amendment right of association. The Court reasoned that public
identification with the party was not a necessary requirement for voting
in the party's primary. Noting that various people played various roles in
political parties, the Court concluded that "the act of formal enrollment
or public affiliation with the Party is merely one element in the contin-
uum of participation in Party affairs, and need not be in any sense the
most important." '363 The Court extended its reasoning to the claim that
"acts of public affiliation may subject the members of political organiza-
tions to public hostility or discrimination; under those circumstances an
association has a constitutional right to protect the privacy of its mem-
bership rolls. ' '36
The Court found no compelling state interest in regulating the
Republican Party's decision to permit independent voters to participate
in its party primary election.3 65 The majority appeared to question the
very idea that a government could have a compelling state interest in
matters relating to a party primary, or at least with respect to the relative
merits of open and closed primaries, where the Court found no consen-
sus on the relation between the form of primary elections, the integrity
of the election process, and responsible party government.366 The major-
ity observed that "[u]nder these circumstances, the views of the State,
which to some extent represent the views of one political party tran-
siently enjoying majority power, as to the optimum methods for preserv-
ing party integrity lose much of their force. ' 367 The majority opinion
attempted to limit the scope and force of this observation by asserting in
a footnote that "[o]ur holding today does not establish that state regula-
tion of primary voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a
political party or its members" and concluding that "[t]he analysis of
these situations derives much from the particular facts involved.
368
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice O'Connor, provided an alternative analysis of the issue
before the Court:
Both the right of free political expression and the State's authority to
establish arrangements that assure fair and effective party participa-
tion in the election process are essential to democratic government.
363. Id. at 215. The reasoning here is inconsistent with the reasoning in the expressive-
association cases discussion infra Part IV.B.
364. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215, n.5 (citing NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (state could not require disclosure of membership list as condition for granting a corporate
charter under state law)).
365. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217-25.
366. Id. at 223, n. 11 (survey of state primary election laws).
367. Id. at 224.
368. Id. at 225, n.13.
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Our cases make it clear that the accommodation of these two vital
interests does not lend itself to bright-line rules but requires careful
inquiry into the extent to which the one or the other interest is inordi-
nately impaired under the facts of the particular case.... Even so, the
conclusion reached on the individuated facts of one case sheds some
measure of light upon the conclusion that will be reached on the indi-
viduated facts of the next. Since this is an area, moreover, in which
the predictability of decisions is important, I think it worth noting that
for me today's decision already exceeds the permissible limit of First
Amendment restrictions upon the States' ordering of elections.3
6 9
In the instant case, Justice Scalia questioned the existence of any
association interest, concluding that "[i]t seems to me fanciful to refer to
this as an interest in freedom of association between the members of the
Republican Party and the putative independent voters."3 7 Analogizing
the association between a voter registered as an independent created by
voting in the Republican Party primary to that created by a registered
Democrat who responds to questions by a Republican Party pollster,
Justice Scalia concluded that "[i]f the concept of freedom of association
is extended to such casual contacts, it ceases to be of any analytic
use."
371
Justice Scalia then questioned the process by which the Republican
Party decided to open its primary to voters registered as independents,
suggesting that the decision had been taken by party managers and
officeholders, not by party members. He observed that "I had always
thought it was a major purpose of state-imposed party primary require-
ments to protect the general party membership against this sort of minor-
ity control." '37 2 He concluded that a state "may lawfully require that
significant elements of the democratic election process be democratic-
whether the Party wants that or not."373Although Justice Scalia made no
reference to the White Primary cases, this is what the Court held in these
cases.
374
369. Id. at 234-35.
370. Id. at 235.
371. Id. at 235 (citing Justice Powell's dissent in Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel.
La Follette, 450 U.S.107, 130-31 (1981), calling for careful consideration of what activities are at
issue in cases involving party primaries.)
372. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 236. Justice Scalia's solicitude for party members is inconsistent
with his position in the campaign-finance cases that organization members have no rights to
question the use of an organization's general treasury funds for campaign expenditures. For an
analysis of these issue in the campaign finance cases, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political
Speech and the Balance of Powers: A New Framework for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in
Wisconsin Right To Life, 27 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 267 (2008).
373. Id. at 237.
374. Why Justice Thurgood Marshall, who had devised the litigation strategy in the White
Primary cases, took the position he did in writing the majority opinion is beyond the scope of this
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The Court's deference to political-party managers continued in Eu
v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.3 75 In a unani-
mous opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Court held that California
statutes prohibiting party endorsements in primary elections and defin-
ing governance requirements for political parties violated the political
parties' rights of association. In this case the Court found that "the asso-
ciational rights at stake are much stronger than those we credited in
Tashjian."'3 76 In this case, in contrast to the case in Tashjian, "party
members do not seek to associate with nonparty members, but only with
one another in freely choosing their party leaders. 37 7
These First Amendment cases entrench the concept that a party's
associational rights are an end in itself. They leave no doubt that these
cases are entrenching the rights of party managers with no regard for
voters or for the role of voting. What had begun in the White Primary
cases as a response to claims that political parties are private associa-
tions that cannot be regulated because they do not engage in state action
has become a constitutionalized deference to party managers' unfettered
discretion based on the First Amendment right of association. The analy-
sis has shifted from whether the party is engaged in state action that may
be regulated to whether the state can establish a compelling state interest
in regulating any choices made by party managers. The cases decided to
date suggest that this is highly unlikely, even if the statute is protecting
the rights of voters.378 The voters have disappeared from the calculus
and voting is no longer a constitutionally protected activity at the core of
government legitimacy.
The potential weakness in these cases was that association itself has
no substantive content as a constitutional doctrine. This has been quite
evident in the political-party cases, where the Court briefly considered
but did not pursue the enthusiasm of professional political scientists that
deference to party managers strengthened the party system in ways that
enhanced good government.379
This potential weakness in the First Amendment jurisprudence of
deference to party managers was addressed by the jurisprudence of
expressive association that began as a challenge to organization manag-
article, but adds to the complexity of understanding the relationship between the White Primary
cases and the later political-party associational rights cases.
375. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
376. Id. at 230.
377. Id. at 230-31.
378. For this principle in action, see the analysis of Nelson v. Dean, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1271
(N.D. Fla. 2007), infra Part V.
379. See theme in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) and Democratic Party of the U.S.
v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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ers who claimed the right to control membership in their organizations.
In the early cases, discussed below, women successfully claimed the
right to participate in organizations that had previously excluded them.
These cases provided some basis for an inclusive and participatory juris-
prudence of association, but the Court took a very different turn and
blended expressive association with the exclusionary and nonpar-
ticipatory jurisprudence of the private-association cases. When the
expressive-association doctrine was applied to political parties, it had the
result of entrenching the rights of party managers even if this result
meant limitations on individual voters' rights as both voters and as party
members. The expression that was being protected provided the content,
or at least the illusion of content, to the right of association. This right
was protected even if it resulted in constitutionally suspect
discrimination.
B. Political Parties as Expressive Associations
Political parties have claimed not only that they are private associa-
tions but also that they are expressive associations. While the parties'
claims that they are private associations are defensive claims designed to
forestall the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims of voters, the
parties' expressive-association claims allow the parties to play offense
by asserting specific First Amendment rights. The expressive-associa-
tion claims clash with voters' claims as both voters and as party mem-
bers. This is a claim based on a concept of a political party as a
nonparticipatory association that has expressive associational rights
independently of the associational rights the party may derive from the
associational rights of its members or voters or contributors. In this
sense, expressive association is well designed to entrench the authority
of party managers.
The jurisprudence of expressive association was consolidated in a
series of cases striking down discrimination on the basis of gender in the
membership of certain types of private associations. This was a rapidly
evolving jurisprudence, changing from a recognition of expressive asso-
ciation as a right of both members and the organization to the assertion
that organization managers controlled the content of the organization's
expressive association. A series of cases that began with protection
against discrimination culminated in a case that established an organiza-
tion's expressive associational rights as a constitutionally permissible
rationale for discrimination. Although none of these associations was
itself a political party or even an advocacy organization, the Court cited
cases dealing with political parties throughout its development of the
doctrine of expressive association. In 2000, two days apart the Court
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announced both Dale, which held that Dale's claims of discrimination
must give way to the organization managers' claims based on the Boy
Scouts' claim of expressive associational rights,38 ° and California Dem-
ocratic Party v. Jones, which relied on the party managers' claims
invoking the right of expressive association against voters who wished
to vote in the Democratic Party primary.38 1 The result in Jones might
well have been the same under the post-Civil War voting-rights cases
and the White Primary Cases, but it is significant going forward that the
Court relied in part on the expressive associational claims made by the
party managers.382 By 2000, expressive associational claims had been
allocated by the Court to organizations, which is to say to their manag-
ers, and had been denied to the members or voters.3 8 3 This was not an
inevitable trajectory for expressive-association jurisprudence.
The first case in the contemporary development of expressive asso-
ciation involved two chapters of the Jaycees that decided to admit
women to full membership in 1974 and 1975.384 The national organiza-
tion threatened to revoke the charters of these two chapters, both of
which were in Minnesota, which had enacted a state statute prohibiting
discrimination based on gender.385 The United States Jaycees brought
suit in federal district court claiming that the state statute violated the
rights of its members under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.386
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan described freedom of
expressive association as "a right to associate for the purpose of engag-
ing in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion. ' 387 He found that "[t]he Constitution guarantees freedom of
association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other
individual liberties. 3 88 Justice Brennan underscored the character of
expressive association as a right of individuals when he observed that:
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the gov-
ernment for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously pro-
tected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
380. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659-60 (2000).
381. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571.
382. See id. at 581-82.
383. See id.; Dale, 530 U.S. at 656; Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)
("implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends").
384. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609.
385. Id. at 614-16 (discussing the Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3)).
386. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
387. Id. at 618.
388. Id.
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engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaran-
teed.... According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared
goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural
diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by
the majority.38 9
The majority held that the Minnesota statute addressed a compelling
state interest in combating discrimination, including discrimination on
the basis of gender, and did so by the least-restrictive means of achiev-
ing this purpose.39 °
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but not in the Court's
reasoning with respect to expressive association.39' She found that the
majority opinion "accords insufficient protection to expressive associa-
tions and places inappropriate burdens on groups claiming the protection
of the First Amendment." '392 She took exception to the requirement that
an organization make "a 'substantial' showing that admission of unwel-
come members 'will change the message communicated by the group's
speech"' on grounds that this requirement would allow commercial
associations to claim protection under the First Amendment as expres-
sive associations to defend against claims that they engaged in discrimi-
natory practices.393
Justice O'Connor took the position that the first step in the analysis
of expressive associational claims should be whether the organization
making the claim "is an association whose activities or purposes should
engage the strong protections that the First Amendment extends to
expressive associations. 394 She contrasted rights of expressive associa-
tions with the "minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of com-
mercial association. 395
Justice O'Connor would also have distinguished among the various
activities in which an organization might engage, reasoning that "[t]he
dichotomy between rights of commercial association and rights of
expressive association is also found in the more limited constitutional
protections accorded an association's recruitment and solicitation activi-
ties and other dealings with its members and the public. 3 9 6 She gave the
example of regulations of labor unions, where "a State may compel
association for the commercial purposes of engaging in collective bar-
389. Id. at 622 (citations omitted).
390. Id. at 628.
391. Id. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
392. Id. at 632.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 633.
395. Id. at 634.
396. Id.
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gaining, administering labor contracts, and adjusting employment-
related grievances," but "[tlhe State may not, on the other hand, compel
association with a union engaged in ideological activities. 397 She recog-
nized that "[d]etermining whether an association's activity is predomi-
nantly protected expression will often be difficult, if only because a
"1398ter-broad range of activities can be expressive. In making this determi
nation, she would have looked at the "purposes of an association, and
the purposes of its members in adhering to it."
39 9
Consistent with this analysis, Justice O'Connor characterized the
Jaycees as a commercial organization based on the "commercial nature
of the Jaycees' activities." 4" She noted that the Court of Appeals had
found that the Jaycees' advocacy of political and public causes was a
significant activity.40' Justice O'Connor did not dispute these findings,
but noted that individuals tended to join the Jaycees for business rea-
sons, that the focus on membership recruitment was presented as train-
ing in "solicitation and management,"40 2 that businesses sometimes paid
their employees' dues in the Jaycees, and that "[t]he Jaycees itself refers
to its members as customers and membership as a product it is sell-
ing. '40 3 She concluded that because the Jaycees is a commercial associa-
tion it may not claim First Amendment protection from the Minnesota
antidiscrimination law.40 4
Justice O'Connor's analysis is consistent with the Court's reason-
ing in looking at both the organization and its members' association
rights. She focused both on the overall character of the organization's
activities and on whether the statute at issue regulated commercial or
expressive activities.40 5
The second case involved the revocation by the Board of Directors
of Rotary International of the charter of the Rotary Club of Duarte, Cali-
fornia, because it admitted women to full membership." 6 The Court
held that the Board of Directors of Rotary International could not rely on
an expressive-association claim to sustain discrimination against women
contrary to the requirements of a California statute prohibiting discrimi-
397. Id. at 638 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)) (noting that the
Court applied the commercial-ideological distinction in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466
U.S. 435 (1984)).
398. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 639.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. (citing U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 769 (Minn. 1982)).
404. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 640.
405. Id. at 638-40.
406. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541 (1987).
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nation against women by business associations.4 °7 The Court held that
Rotary was a business association to which the California statute applied
because business concerns are a motivating factor in joining local Rotary
clubs.408
The most interesting feature of this case was the attempt made by
Rotary International to rely on the expressive-association concept as
developed in Roberts.4"9 Although this attempt was rejected, subsequent
cases would see the same use not only of expressive association as a
general principle, but also the effort to adapt Roberts to the defense of
discrimination that became fully entrenched in the law in Dale.41 °
In Dale the Court allocated the right of expressive association to
the organization, which is to say, to the managers of an organization.411
As in the other expressive-association cases, the issue was whether an
organization could invoke its right of expressive association as protec-
tion against claims that the organization had discriminated against a
potential member. 41' The discrimination claims at issue here were
claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation.41 3
The Supreme Court held that the Boys Scouts enjoyed a First
Amendment right of expressive association protecting the organization's
right to select its members and to exclude those whose membership
would be inconsistent with the organization's expression of its values.41 4
The Court found that the Boy Scouts are an expressive association and
that permitting Dale to remain a member would impair its expression.415
It then determined that applying the New Jersey public-accommodation
statute to require that the Boy Scouts reinstate Dale would violate the
407. Id at 549. The California statute at issue was the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 51 (West 2006).
408. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 543 (citing Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l,
224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 226 (Ct. App. 1986).
409. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 544-46.
410. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). For an analysis of associational claims and discrimination, see
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 595 (2001).
411. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
412. Id. at 644; see also Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 539; Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
612 (1984).
413. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644-47. James Dale was an Eagle Scout who then became an assistant
scoutmaster. Id. at 644. Dale's membership in the Boy Scouts was revoked a month after he was
identified in the press as the co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. Id. at
645. Dale brought suit in New Jersey state court claiming that the Boy Scouts had violated the
New Jersey public accommodation statute. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 (West 2007) and
10:5-5 (West 2008)).
414. The Court split 5-4, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority consisting of
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 643. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer dissented. Id. at 663.
415. Id. at 647-56.
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organization's freedom of expressive association.
4 16
The problem the Court faced was that it was far from clear that the
Boy Scouts in fact had a policy of any kind relating to sexual identity.41 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court had found that "Boy Scout members do
not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexu-
ality is immoral; Boy Scouts discourages its leaders from disseminating
any views on sexual issues; and Boy Scouts includes sponsors and mem-
bers who subscribe to different views in respect of homosexuality."418
The Court did not directly contradict these findings but instead it relied
on the briefs filed with the Court by the Boy Scouts as evidence419 and,
based on this unorthodox evidence, it then redefined the nature and
extent of the evidentiary showing necessary to establish that the organi-
zation was an expressive association and that its freedom of expressive
association would be impaired.4"' By treating statements in briefs as evi-
dence, the Court took the position that members had no role in shaping
or adopting policies, in receiving notice of or information about policies,
or even in being aware of policies.421 In so doing, the Court ignored or
discounted the associational rights and claims of members and made
expressive association an arena in which only the views of managers,
whether or not formally expressed as part of the organization's docu-
416. Id. at 656-61.
417. In his dissent, Justice Souter, which Justices Ginsberg and Breyer joined, took the
position that the Boy Scouts "has not made out an expressive association claim ... because of its
failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it
customarily employs to state its message." Id. at 701. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, which
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, took the same position, stating that "[an expressive
association claim, however, normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a consistent position
on some issue over time." Id. at 696. Justice Stevens devoted a substantial portion of his dissent to
the point that the Boys Scouts as an organization had never adopted a policy relating
homosexuality. Id. at 683-97.
418. Id. at 654-55 (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A. 2d 1196, 1223 (N.J.
1999)).
419. Dale, 530 U.S. at 651. Justice Stevens in his dissent took vigorous exception to this
approach, concluding that "[t]his is an astounding view of the law." Id. at 686. He observed that "I
am unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitutional right
was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further."
Id. He reasoned that "we must inquire whether the group is, in fact, expressing a message
(whatever it may be) and whether that message (if one is expressed) is significantly affected by a
State's antidiscrimination law. More critically, that inquiry requires our independent analysis,
rather than deference to a group's litigating posture." Id. For an academic critique of the
majority's approach, see Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001).
420. Dale, 530 U.S. at 651. The Court held that "even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout
leaders from disseminating views on sexual issues ...the First Amendment protects the Boy
Scouts' method of expression. If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout leaders to avoid questions of
sexuality and teach only by example, this fact does not negate the sincerity of its belief discussed
above." Id. at 655.
421. See id. at 651.
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ments and records, were relevant. This approach introduces an element
of opacity amounting to lawlessness into the internal governance of
associations and then makes this kind of opacity the basis of a constitu-
tional claim. The Court dismissed these concerns with the observation
that "the First Amendment simply does not require that every member of
a group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be
'expressive association."' 4 " The Court found that the nexus between the
organization's purposes and the message at the core of its claims to the
right of expressive association need be tenuous at best.42 3 The Court
held that "associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of dis-
seminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of
the First Amendment." '424 Instead, the Court held that "[a]n association
must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in
order to be entitled to protection. '"425
The Court not only relied on evidence unavailable to and thus
unknowable by members, but it also articulated a highly deferential stan-
dard based on such evidence for determining whether the Boy Scouts'
expression would be impaired by complying with the requirements of
the New Jersey statute.4 26 The Court held that "[a]s we give deference to
an association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we
must also give deference to an association's view of what would impair
its expression. '' 42 7 What, then, remains of the judicial role? The Court
422. Id. at 655. The Court found "irrelevant" Dale's argument that the Boy Scouts did not
revoke the membership of heterosexual Scout leaders who openly disagreed with the Boy Scouts
policy, reasoning:
The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant
scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a
heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts
policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message
but not the other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its view from the
housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views
receive no First Amendment protection.
Id. at 655-56.
423. Id. at 655.
424. Id. This is a response to the contrary finding of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id.
425. Id. In so holding, the Court relied on Hurley, reasoning that "the purpose of the St.
Patrick's Day parade in Hurley was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held
that the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonetheless." Id. The
excluded participant was an Irish gay and lesbian organization. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995). The Court, without
comment, treated the Irish identity of the excluded group as irrelevant to a claim to march in a St.
Patrick's Day parade. Id. at 570.
426. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
427. Id. In his dissent Justice Stevens emphatically rejected this degree of deference to the
organization's characterization of its own positions, reasoning:
If this Court were to defer to whatever position an organization is prepared to assert
in its briefs, there would be no way to mark the proper boundary between genuine
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observed that "[t]hat is not to say that an expressive association can erect
a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere
acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its mes-
sage" but then proceeded to argue that accepting Dale as a member
would impair the Boy Scouts' message.428 In making this argument, the
Court equated the Boy Scouts' message to opposition to homosexual
conduct and made no reference to the activities that had been the basis
for Dale's having become an Eagle Scout.4 2 9 As described by the Court,
the Boy Scouts appear to be indistinguishable from a single-issue advo-
cacy organization. As a result, the nexus between the organization's pur-
poses and the expression it is claiming would be impaired need only be
tenuous, and yet the member claiming rights of association can and will
be denied any First Amendment rights of association even if that mem-
ber does not comply with every element of the organization's policies,
even if those policies are tenuous and not publicly promulgated by the
organization.4 30 The asymmetry between the members' rights and the
organization's rights could not be starker or more encompassing.4 31 It is
difficult to see how Dale can be reconciled with Roberts or Rotary Club
of Duarte.
The same can be said of the Court's analysis of preventing discrim-
ination in public accommodation in Dale.4 32 The Court acknowledged
that it had found a compelling state interest in preventing discrimination
against women in the state public-accommodation laws in Roberts and
Rotary Club of Duarte, but then created a new test that balanced the
state interest against the severity of the intrusion into the organization's
expressive association.4 33 The Court found that its prior opinions involv-
ing discrimination against women "would not materially interfere with
exercises of the right to associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply
attempts to insulate nonexpressive private discrimination, on the other hand.
Shielding a litigant's claim from judicial scrutiny would, in turn, render civil rights
legislation a nullity, and turn this important constitutional right into a farce.
Accordingly, the Court's prescription of total deference will not do.
Id. at 687.
428. Id. at 653.
429. Id.
430. "The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts' beliefs" comprehensively
"and found that 'exclusion of members solely on the basis of their sexual orientation"' was
inconsistent with its other goals and beliefs. Id. at 650-51 (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,
734 A. 2d 1196, 1226 (N.J. 1999)). The Court then curtly dismissed this approach and this finding
by observing that "it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values because they
disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent." Id. at 651 (citation omitted).
431. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 410, at 604-09 (critique of the Court's "corporate-
governance model" that ignores members and looks only to the views of managers).
432. See id. at 656-59.
433. Id. at 657-59.
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the ideas that the organization sought to express, 4 34 but that in Dale
"[t]he state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations
law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to
freedom of expressive association.
435
Two days after it issued its opinion in Dale, the Court issued Cali-
fornia Democratic Party v. Jones, which applied expressive-association
claims to hold that a California statute mandating blanket primaries
rather than closed primaries. 43 6 A blanket primary permits any voter to
vote for any candidate of any party. This system did not apply to presi-
dential primaries under the California statute. 437 Four California political
parties challenged the state statute on First Amendment grounds.438
Jones is important not because it addressed a blanket primary or even
because the Court overturned a blanket primary approved by the voters
in a referendum but because it consolidated political parties' ability to
assert a First Amendment claim that a state statute violated a party's
right of association in the context of a primary election. The Court in
Jones did not address such questions as whether a political party is a
private association or whether the primary is an election. Instead, the
Court simply ignored these questions. It did not distinguish between
types of associations or the setting in which the activity took place. The
First Amendment right of association as set forth in Jones is absolute
and undifferentiated. It is difficult to imagine any situation in which a
political party could not rely on this version of expressive association to
defeat claims by voters, provided only that the claims did not involve
issues of racial discrimination. As in Dale, the Court defined the issue as
the right of political party managers to define the party and, in the pro-
cess, ignored or rejected any claims made by or on behalf of voters or
party members.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, acknowledged
that "Is]tates have a major role to play in structuring and monitoring the
election process, including primaries. 4 39 But, the Court then limited the
reach of its precedents by finding that "[w]hat we have not held, how-
ever, is that the process by which political parties select their nominees
are, as respondents would have it, wholly public affairs that States may
434. Id. at 657.
435. Id. at 659. In this analysis the Court relied on Hurley, even though it noted that it had
never found in that case that the parade was an expressive association. Id. The Court observed that
"[a]lthough we did not explicitly deem the parade in Hurley an expressive association, the analysis
we applied there is similar to the analysis we apply here." Id.
436. 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
437. Id. at 570, n.2.
438. Id. at 571.
439. Id. at 572.
[Vol. 64:535
2010] CONSTITUTIVE VOTING AND PARTICIPATORY ASSOCIATION 617
regulate freely.""' In the next sentence, Justice Scalia put primary elec-
tions into a framework that treats party primaries as just another internal
process of a political party, stating that "[t]o the contrary, we have con-
tinually stressed that when States regulate parties' internal processes
they must act within limits imposed by the Constitution.""' 1 The major-
ity does not address what these constitutional limits might be. Instead,
the majority simply cites Eu and LaFollette with no discussion of what
elements of these cases might be relevant." 2
In order to maintain this position, the Court faced the difficulty of
what to do about the White Primary cases, which created a record of
regulation of state primaries on the grounds that primaries are integral
parts of the election process and that regulation of primaries was essen-
tial to the maintaining the role of the people in the constitutional struc-
ture. Justice Scalia limited the White Primary cases to situations in
which "a State prescribes an election process that gives a special role to
political parties," the result is that the parties' actions become state
action under the Fifteenth Amendment." 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, then found that "[t]hey do not stand for the proposition that
party affairs are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections-
and our later holdings make that entirely clear."'4 4 The reasoning here is
a bootstrap that rests on adjectives. The Court does not explain what
constitutes a "special role" for a political party and how the specialness
of the party's role in a primary election might relate to the rights and
roles of voters in primary elections. His casual reference to "party
affairs" does not address the issue of whether a primary is purely a
'party affair' or the constitutional significance of finding either that pri-
mary elections are or are not 'party affairs' rather than 'public affairs'.
He avoids addressing the Court's evolving understanding in the White
Primary Cases that primary elections are elections and its evolving
understanding that political parties play a public role constituting state
action when they organize primary elections." 5 He avoids considering
the implications of the purpose of the White Primary Cases, which was
to protect the rights of voters. He observes, correctly, that the White
Primary Cases are not First Amendment cases and, in consequence, reli-
ance on the White Primary Cases, particularly Terry v. Adams and Smith
440. Id. at 572-73.
441. Id. at 573 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989) and Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981), both of
which are discussed supra at Part IV.).
442. Id.
443. Jones, 530 U.S. at 573.
444. Id.
445. See supra Part II.B. , Part M, and Part IV.A. 1.
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v. Allwright is "misplaced."" 6 The legerdemain of this assertion is bold
and breathtaking. A primary election is now some undefined private
affair in which political parties play an undefined 'special' role that par-
ties can protect with the full force of associational claims under the First
Amendment. Justice Scalia's reliance on the private-association cases
and the expressive-association cases supports the interpretation that
primaries have become private party activities as they were prior to the
White Primary cases based simply on the parties' 'special' roles in
organizing primary elections. Expressive association, linked with claims
that political parties are private associations, have eliminated state gov-
ernment, the federal government, party members, and voters from any
constitutionally significant role in primary elections.
In response to claims that a primary is a "state-run election" that is
a "public affair," Justice Scalia responded that "[o]f course it is, but
when the election determines a party's nominee it is a party affair as
well, and.., the constitutional rights of those composing the party can-
not be disregarded." 4 7 Justice Scalia then addressed the dissent's argu-
ments based on Allwright and Terry that a political party's associational
claims based on the First Amendment do not support a party's right to
exclude nonmembers from voting in primary elections. He dismissed
Allwright and Terry by concluding that "[t]hose cases simply prevent
exclusion that violates some independent constitutional proscription.""' 8
What Justice Scalia leaves unsaid is that he does not include voting as a
constitutional right or an element of constitutional structure in his
reasoning.
Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for a broad majority of the Court,
focuses on the right of a political party to exclude voters from a primary
election, finding that "a corollary of the right to associate is the right not
to associate.""4 9 Justice Scalia supported this assertion by citing La Fol-
lette and Roberts.45° In so doing, he neartly illustrates the blend of the
renewed claims that political parties are private associations and the
claims that political parties have associational rights indistinguishable
from those of any other private association, even when the party is
involved in a primary election. Indeed, Justice Scalia takes the position
that "[i]n no area is the political association's right to exclude more
important than in the process of selecting its nominee."45'
446. Jones, 530 U.S. at 573.
447. Id. at 573, n.4.
448. Id. at 573, n.5.
449. Id. at 574.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 575. The reason he gave illustrates a fundamental confusion about the
organizational character of a political party and about the relationship between the political party
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This reasoning reached its inevitable point of absurdity in the 2008
Florida primary when the political parties sought to exclude the entire
electorate of registered voters who participated in a closed primary. A
political party by this reasoning consists of party managers who have no
need of and no responsibility to voters. Jones provides this absurd result
unbounded protection under the First Amendment. Voters have disap-
peared from elections and consent has disappeared from the structure of
the Constitution.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens focused on voting rights and the right
and duty of state governments to protect voters.452 He took the position
that "[t]his case is about the State of California's power to decide who
may vote in an election conducted, and paid for, by the State." '453 He
reasoned that:
The United States Constitution imposes constraints on the States'
power to limit access to the polls, but we have never before held or
suggested that it imposes any constraints on States' power to author-
ize additional citizens to participate in any state election for a state
office. In my view, principles of federalism require us to respect the
policy choice made by the States voters in approving Proposition 198
[approving the blanket primary].
454
Justice Stevens took the position that political parties' First Amend-
ment associational rights are not absolute across all activities but instead
vary with the nature of the activities in which the party engages.455
Based on this approach, Justice Stevens distinguished the right of a
political party to control its internal operations from its claims to
exclude voters from a primary election. He observed that "the primary
serves an essential public function" '4 56 He further noted that he cited All-
wright and Terry "because our recognition that constitutional proscrip-
and the party's nominee. Justice Scalia argued that "[t]hat process often determines the party's
positions on the most significant public policy issues of the day, and even when those positions
are predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party's ambassador to the general electorate
in winning it over to the party's views." Id. The critique of this reasoning is not that Justice Scalia
is not wrong about the party as a reflection of the views of the nominee but that he has failed to
consider the implications of this possibility, or even probability, for his assertions about the right
to exclude. If the party itself has no views, the case for exclusion of voters from primaries erodes.
452. Id. at 590-603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
453. Id. at 590 (footnote omitted).
454. Id. at 590-91. Justice Stevens has consistently confronted Justice Rehnquist's new
federalism with his own claims relating to the rights of states when this would produce a result
inconsistent with the substantive preferences of the new federalism majority of the Rehnquist
Court. Justice Stevens was not the only justice to use this case for a larger agenda. Justice
Kennedy's concurrence focused on the relationship he saw between the right to exclude voters
from primaries and the right to use party treasury funds in elections. Id. at 586-90 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
455. Id. at 593-97.
456. Id. at 594, n.4.
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tions apply to primaries illustrates that primaries-as integral parts of
the election process by which the people select their government-are
state affairs, not internal party affairs. '457 Justice Stevens made voting
and voters the central issue, just as the Court had done in extricating
itself from Grovey in Classic, Smith v. Allwright, and Terry v. Adams.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens found himself enmeshed in a problem
arising from the Court's contemporary cases treating political parties as
private associations.458 In these cases the Court held that a variety of
decisions by national party managers or state party managers should,
based on a First Amendment right of association, take precedence over
state statutes. There is no substantive coherence to these decisions. The
Court made no arguments about why independents should vote in Con-
necticut primaries or why particular delegates should be seated at a party
national convention. The only commonality in these cases was the pro-
cedural decision that the party managers should decide, that party rules
took precedence over voting consistent with state statutes. Confronting
this conceptual morass, Justice Stevens, who had been in the majority in
all of these cases, tried unsuccessfully to find coherence where none
existed. He first suggested that national conventions are private activities
while primary elections are public activities. This approach cannot be
sustained without overruling the White Primary Cases or robbing them
of any significance as voting-rights cases. With this approach Justice
Stevens falls into the trap of procedural formalism that led to Grovey.
Primaries matter because they involve voting. If the results of primary
elections can be negated by party managers' control over party nominat-
ing conventions, then voting is an empty gesture rather than a constitu-
tive act that sustains government legitimacy.
Justice Stevens then tries to avoid this result by embracing cases
that uphold party managers' rights to control political parties as private
associations if the outcome of their actions is increased participation in
primary elections. This approach is neither principled nor administrable.
The Court cannot possibly know what impact its decisions or the actions
of party managers will have on voter participation.
Justice Stevens found his way out of this morass by curtailing,
albeit indirectly, his prior positions on the associational rights of the
political parties. He stated flatly that "[i]n my view, the First Amend-
ment does not mandate that a putatively private association be granted
the power to dictate the organizational structure of state-run, state-
financed primary elections." '459 He rejected the idea that the Court in the
457. Id. at 594, n.5.
458. For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part IV.A.2.
459. Jones, 530 U.S. at 598.
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prior cases or in this case had endorsed a theory of democracy, asserting
that "[i]t is not this Court's constitutional function to choose between the
competing visions of what makes democracy work-party autonomy
and discipline versus progressive inclusion of the entire electorate in the
process of selecting their public officials-that are held by the litigants
in this case. '460 He concluded "[t]hat choice belongs to the people."4 6 '
Justice Stevens relied on the structure of First Amendment jurispru-
dence to resolve the difficulty presented by his prior positions upholding
rights of political parties as private associations and his discomfort with
the consequences of absolutism in this area. He called for a balance
between the claims of the association and the interests of the state, an
approach which had been lost in the expressive-association cases. Justice
Stevens then found that in Jones the claims of the party autonomy pro-
ponents were weak and empirically debatable and concluded "[i]n my
view, an empirically debatable assumption about the relative number
and effect of likely crossover voters in a blanket primary, as opposed to
an open primary or a nominally closed primary with only a brief prereg-
istration requirement, is too thin a reed to support a credible First
Amendment distinction." '462 On the other side, Justice Stevens agreed
with the District Court in finding the state's interest in "fostering demo-
cratic government" by increasing the choice offered to voters and
increasing voter turnout and participation "'substantial, indeed compel-
ling."' 463 He observed that "[tihe Court's glib rejection of the State's
interest in increasing voter participation . . . is particularly regretta-
ble. '4 64 He then noted that "I would also give some weight to the First
Amendment associational interests of nonmembers of a party seeking to
participate in the primary process. 4 65 Even Justice Stevens, however,
made no reference to a consideration of voting as constitutive as a coun-
terbalancing consideration. The post-Civil War cases and the White Pri-
mary Cases did not become part the balance. Had Justice Stevens
expanded his concept of participation to include the importance of con-
sent, his balancing of interests would have been more compelling and
less enmeshed in the jurisprudence of party managers' associational
claims. The Supreme Court has not considered a subsequent case that
raises directly the associational rights of political parties in structuring
primary elections. It did, however, apply its expressive association
framework in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
460. Id. at 598-99.
461. Id. at 599.
462. Id. at 600.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 600-01.
465. Id. at 601.
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Party.4 6 6 Writing for a majority that included the dissenting justices in
Jones, Justice Thomas held that a state law enacted pursuant to a state
referendum could state candidates' party preferences, despite the objec-
tions of the political parties, because the vote involved did not select the
parties' candidates but simply "winnow[ed] the number of candi-
dates. 467 In addition, the listing of the candidate's party preference cre-
ated, according to the majority, only the "impression of association '4 68
and not what Justice Thomas described as "actual association. 4 69 This
places enormous weight on two undefined adjectives. It may be more
important that the majority held that "[tihe State's asserted interest in
providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the
ballot is easily sufficient to sustain 1-872" [the ballot measure at
issue].4 70 This holding may represent a willingness to consider a com-
pelling state interest less demanding than that previously required in
expressive-association cases. But, there is now little doubt that expres-
sive association is the analytical framework in primary-election cases. In
his strangely convoluted concurring opinion attempting to accommodate
Justice Scalia's angry dissent and the majority's position, which he
appears to have joined primarily to buy time and preserve his options in
future cases, Chief Justice Roberts relied on his interpretation of voters'
perceptions. 47' Although he does not explain how the Court would
ascertain voters' perceptions or locate this concept in Justice Thomas'
distinction between actual association and the impression of association,
Chief Justice Roberts left no doubt that he regards Dale as controlling
authority if the issue is framed in terms of voters' impressions.472 Justice
Scalia rejected Chief Justice Roberts' temporizing because he rejected
the idea that a political party would ever have to produce evidence in
claiming associational rights under the First Amendment.473 Justice
Scalia similarly rejected, then dismissed the majority's finding of a com-
pelling state interest as "undeserving of credence. 47 4
There can now be little doubt that expressive association controls
the Court's approach to political-party rights and that Dale provides the
466. 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
467. Id. at 1192.
468. Id. at 1194, n.9.
469. Id. Citing Hurley and Dale, Justice Thomas reasoned: "In those cases, actual association
threatened to distort the groups' intended messages. We are aware of no case in which the mere
impression of association was held to place a severe burden on a group's First Amendment rights,
but we need not decide that question here." Id. (emphasis in original).
470. Id. at 1195.
471. Id. at 1196-97.
472. Id. at 1196.
473. Id. at 1202.
474. Id. at 1203.
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framework of the Court's approach to expressive association. The result
is a constitutionalized deference to political-party managers. The Court
remains silent on the role and rights of voters in primary elections. Man-
agers of nonparticipatory associations can negate the votes of their own
members in primary elections conducted without claims of voting irreg-
ularity. This is precisely what happened in Florida in 2008.
V. THE 2008 FLORIDA PRIMARIES: VOTE NEGATION AND POLITICAL
PARTIES' ASSOCIATIONAL CLAIMS
The vote negation of the Florida primaries is a logical but by no
means inevitable result of according party managers' roles in structuring
primary elections First Amendment protection while not according vot-
ers any constitutionally significant role. The result has been an imbal-
ance in constitutional jurisprudence that accords party managers
discretion to impose party discipline on voters while ignoring the role of
voters in sustaining the legitimacy of the government. Voters have been
deprived of their constitutional role to "ordain and establish this Consti-
tution for the United States of America. ' 4  In the process, the idea of
consent as the basis of government has been obscured if not lost. The
jurisprudence of voting is no longer structural. The result is a paradox
that places voters at the greatest risk of vote negation when elections are
conducted in a procedurally regular manner under applicable federal and
state law but in a manner that violates internal rules of political parties.
The 2008 Florida presidential primary was an election in which
Florida voters voted. Both major parties then excluded their votes in the
determination of who would serve as delegates to the parties' national
nominating conventions. The voters in the Florida presidential primaries
were as effectively disenfranchised as the voters in the post-Civil War
cases and in the White Primary cases whose votes were simply not
counted. How could this have happened?
The party managers negated the votes of their duly registered mem-
bers in a properly conducted primary election solely on grounds of a
timing mismatch between a state statute and parties' rules relating to the
scheduling of primaries. This claim by party managers can be taken seri-
ously only in the analytical framework of expressive association that
treats the parties as coterminous with their managers and ignores associ-
ational rights of members or voters. The logical result is political parties
with neither members nor voters, only managers. Parties' claims that
they are both private associations and expressive associations lead to
absurd results. In the process, the First Amendment has become an
475. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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instrument protecting, not prohibiting, discrimination against any
"other" whom party managers or associational leaders wish to exclude.
While these claims cannot prevail in the case of racial discrimination,
Dale shows that other forms of discrimination will find no counter-
vailing protection under the Equal Protection Clause or any other consti-
tutional predicate that the Court has been willing to consider. Because
the Court has moved so far away from its prior jurisprudence of voting
as structural and constitutive, voters have no countervailing claim as
voters. A political party can negate the vote of all of its voters. Party
discipline has become a First Amendment right of party managers that
will sustain their determination to disenfranchise all voters.
This result became a judicial precedent in the one case arising from
the 2008 Florida primaries, Nelson v. Dean.47 6 The court described the
issue in this case in the following terms: "The issue is whether the Dem-
ocratic national convention must seat Florida delegates chosen on the
basis of a binding state primary conducted in open defiance of the
national party's scheduling rules. 4 77 The court concluded in the follow-
ing sentence that "[t]he answer is no." '47 8 The court's reasoning is a clas-
sic expression of the conflation of private association and expressive
association creating a First Amendment right to create parties without
members and elections without voters, as well as an unintended restruc-
turing of both federalism and the balance of powers as unconsidered
collateral damage.
The court based its ruling on a finding that political parties are pri-
vate associations and relied primarily on Cousins v. Wigoda.41 9 As a
preliminary matter, the court sought to limit the force as it had in the
White Primary cases by ruminating about whether their state-action rea-
soning applies to this case.4 80 Having taken this path, the court found
that the defendant political parties "would be entitled to prevail even if it
were held that the DNC delegate selection rules and the decision to
476. 528 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Fla. 2007).
477. Id. at 1272.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1277-78.
480. Id. at 1276-77. The court suggested several possibilities:
Perhaps the white primary cases should be distinguished based on the implicit state
approval of the explicitly-racist machinations the party pursued. Or perhaps the
cases should be seen simply as an instance of hard cases making bad law (or,
perhaps more accurately, seemingly easy cases making law that will not be followed
in less compelling circumstances). Or perhaps one could conclude that the Fifteenth
Amendment-with its specific focus on racial discrimination in voting-has a
broader state action sweep than the Fourteenth .... But the white primary cases at
least give some reason to question whether the state action concept is as narrow as
the DNC and Dr. Dean would have it.
Id. at 1277 (citation omitted).
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exclude Florida delegates were sufficiently entwined with state-run
primaries to constitute state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."48 What the court did not do is to consider the voting as a
constitutional structural element of the White Primary cases and instead
focused solely on the role political parties.482
With the White Primary cases read partially and narrowly, the court
turned to the Democratic Party's First Amendment rights and found that
"Cousins is fatal to plaintiffs' position in the case at bar." '4 83 The court
found that under the First Amendment "[a] national party has a compel-
ling interest in setting a schedule and requiring compliance." '484 It is not
at all clear what this interest might be. The court found that alterations in
the primary schedule makes a "substantive difference" but did not
address the nature of this substantive difference. 485 A state that wants to
alter this schedule established by the national party is acting "for its own
selfish reasons." '486 The court concluded that
it is the state that must have a compelling interest in order to override
the party's First Amendment right to seat delegates of its choice. The
party need not have a compelling interest in its own rules.4 87
By focusing on the party and the government through a state-action
prism that it had previously found inapplicable, the court made this case
much easier than it is and produced an opinion that is the kind of "bad
law" the court suggested might have resulted from the Supreme Court's
decisions in the White Primary cases.
The bad law in this case arises from the court's easy dismissal of
any rights or interests that voters might have in primary elections. The
court found that "the party has a First Amendment right to exclude dele-
gates selected in derogation of the schedule." '488 At this point the court
begins to incorporate concepts from the jurisprudence of expressive
association without acknowledging what it is doing or citing any of the
expressive-association precedents.489 When it addresses the rights of
voters in primaries, the court simply transforms the issue from an issue
of voters' right to vote, have their votes counted, and have their vote
count to an issue of whether the delegates were chosen in a manner that
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1281.
483. Id. at 1278.
484. Id. at 1280.
485. Id. It appears that the court might be referring obliquely to electoral outcomes, a
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conforms to the party rules.490 Because they were not, they become
"nonconforming delegates," which places the issue in the framework of
expressive-association jurisprudence.4 9' This issue arose in the context
of plaintiffs' claim that the exclusion of all of the delegates was unduly
harsh. This is scarcely the heart of the issue. So framed, plaintiffs' claim
afforded the court an easy path to its oblique incorporation of expressive
association by reasoning as follows:
Plaintiffs say that Florida's Democratic voters are being disen-
franchised. The decisive answer is that the decision whether to
exclude nonconforming delegates rests with the party, not with the
Florida legislature or plaintiffs or this court. This is the essence of the
First Amendment right of association recognized in Cousins and La
Follete and O'Brien and Wymbs and Bachur and Ripon. Indeed, the
square import of La Folette was that the Democratic Party could
properly exclude a state's entire delegation for failure to comply with
party rules. That is what the DNC proposes to do here.492
The court never explains how the delegates themselves are "non-
conforming" apart from their manner of selection in a properly con-
ducted primary election that did not conform to the DNC's primary
schedule. There was no claim in this case that the delegates were not
Democrats who would otherwise have been considered perfectly accept-
able delegates. Their subsequent seating at the Democratic National
Convention admits of no other explanation. This fact pattern is not the
common fact pattern of an expressive-association case. In its invocation
of an unacknowledged expressive-association claim in the facts of this
case, the opinion could be read as substantially expanding the scope of
expressive-association claims from substantive differences between the
organization and the aspiring participants to cases where there are no
substantive differences between the organization and its aspiring mem-
bers but are simply disputes over procedures for affiliation and participa-
tion. It seems likely that the court never considered this. It simply
imported a concept of a "nonconforming delegate" to bolster its analysis
of a party as a private association with a First Amendment right to
define its procedures. The court held that the party had no duty to prove
a compelling interest in adopting its rule and rejected any claim that the
state had a compelling state interest. The court held that "[t]he party
need not have a compelling interest in its rules."'4 93 It then held that the
party did have a compelling interest in the schedule of primaries, claim-
ing that the schedule made a "substantive difference" but not addressing
490. Id. at 1281.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 1280.
493. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the nature of this substantive difference.494 It never considered that the
voters had a compelling interest in having their votes accorded appropri-
ate significance in the selection of their parties' presidential candidates.
The central flaw is the court's failure to consider voters and voting.
The court's interest in the White Primary cases did not permit it to read
these cases as structural constitutive-voting cases. When given an oppor-
tunity to consider voters as voters, the court retreated to an unacknowl-
edged expressive-association analysis that excludes voters from
consideration.495 At the same time, this analysis excludes any considera-
tion of voters as party members. 96 The party is simply equated with the
DNC.497 Even the state party does not merit separate consideration.
These analytical flaws are important because they reflect the state of the
jurisprudence, not because this court made any particularly distinctive
contribution to it. In the end, the court returns to the White Primary
cases to suggest that there are some limits on what a political party can
do, but it finds that nothing in this case reaches these limits.
498
These broad concerns about voting and association explain why the
events of the Florida primaries matter and why the issues surrounding
the Florida primaries were not cured by seating the entire Florida dele-
gation at the national conventions. This solution addressed the right of
state party activists to attend the convention that decided nothing but it
did not address the rights of voters whose votes had been negated. Seat-
ing the delegates made voters' rights utterly dependent on the decision
of party managers, not on their right and duty to play their constitutional
role.
VI. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF PARTICIPATORY ASSOCIATION AND
CONSTITUTIVE VOTING
The improbable use of the First Amendment to negate votes in pri-
494. Id.
495. Id. at 1283.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 1281.
498. Id. at 1281. The court observed:
This does not mean, of course, that a party can do whatever it wishes with respect to
delegate selection in general or the schedule in particular. The white primary cases
make clear that there are at least some limits with respect to delegate selection. I
assume without deciding that there are limits on a party's scheduling discretion. But
the discretion is surely broad-at least broad enough to cover any scheduling
decision that is not wholly unreasonable. The DNC's schedule easily passes muster.
Neither the State of Florida nor the Florida Democratic Party have a right to
override the schedule. And plaintiffs have no right to compel the DNC to seat
nonconforming delegates.
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mary elections is not an inescapable result of political parties' First
Amendment claims. The First Amendment itself provides part of the
solution. Including members of political parties in the calculus of associ-
ation rights and recovering and building upon the Court's prior jurispru-
dence of constitutive voting provide the remaining building blocks of a
jurisprudence of participatory association and constitutive voting. A
sterile jurisprudence of ill-considered First Amendment absolutism
would give way to a balancing approach that encompasses the multiple
constitutional predicates implicated in primary elections.
Developing a jurisprudence of constitutive voting for the contem-
porary era is the first step. The fundamental principle is that legitimate
government depends on consent of the governed. In much of our
national history, thinking about the legitimacy of our government would
have appeared incongruous, but that is not the case at this point in our
national history. The legacy of Bush v. Gore is a legacy of questioning
government legitimacy and the role of the Supreme Court in determining
the outcome of a presidential election. 499 This is not to say that the Court
itself is necessarily inclined to embrace this approach, but the bounda-
ries of thought are not determined by the Court. This is especially true in
current circumstances when the Court is pursuing a jurisprudence of
First Amendment absolutism protecting corporations' speech rights in
campaign finance but not voters' rights in primary elections."
Activists, academics, and the Court should rediscover its post-Civil
War and White Primary Cases. In both instances, the Court turned to
voting as an integral element of constitutional structure when doctrinal
complexities threatened to overwhelm the Court's duty to protect voting
rights. The post-Civil War cases have been almost totally lost, relegated
to the status of historical remnants of Reconstruction. Yet, these are not
cases solely about race. They are also cases about voting, and that is
why they are relevant to understanding vote negation in the 2008 Florida
primary.
The same can be said about the contemporary treatment of the
White Primary cases, which have been variously forgotten or ignored or
criticized for their state-action jurisprudence. What has not been done
499. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
500. As this article was being completed, the Court decided Citizens United v. FEC (Jan. 21,
2009) (putting corporate rights at the heart of campaign finance jurisprudence). Compare FEC v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (holding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's
ban on the use of corporate funds for political advertisements in the days leading up to an election
was unconstitutional as applied to advertisements not explicitly supporting a candidate) with Bush,
531 U.S. at 103, 110 (holding that the Florida Supreme Court's method for recounting votes
violated the Equal Protection Clause and there was no time to implement an alternate method).
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has been to read the White Primary cases as containing elements from
which a concept of constitutive voting could be developed.
The next challenge is to redefine the concept of association under
the First Amendment from a nonparticipatory to a participatory frame-
work. This would need to address the core issue of when it is constitu-
tionally appropriate to treat political parties as entities with their own
First Amendment rights that give party managers an operational monop-
oly of First Amendment claims and when it would be constitutionally
appropriate to treat political parties as deriving First Amendment rights
from their members who have their own First Amendment rights. The
party has a First Amendment right to be an association. Members have
First Amendment rights to associate.
The way forward is to treat any activity of the party that implicates
constitutive voting as outside the exclusive control of party managers.
This concept of participatory association presents a host of operational
issues. It is as muddled as democracy. It is the path to ensuring the
continuing consent which is the promise of the Constitution and founda-
tion of government legitimacy.
Fortunately, the structure of First Amendment jurisprudence pro-
vides for the balancing of interests consistent with both participatory
association and constitutive voting. Providing for electoral participation
should be considered a compelling state interest just as it was considered
state action in the White Primary cases. This kind of judicial reasoning
would have been inconsistent with vote negation in the 2008 Florida
primary.
The larger issue may be the more pragmatic operational issue of
participatory association. The effort to craft a realistic concept of par-
ticipatory association is hampered by the absence of contemporary stud-
ies of how political parties operate and what they, in fact, do. It is
difficult for the courts to develop standards in the absence of any com-
mon understanding of political parties and other associations. Yet, such
mistakes as the managers' monopoly of associational claims can be
addressed by developing a jurisprudence of association that treats asso-
ciation as both a noun and a verb, as an organization and a process, as a
First Amendment right of the entity and as a First Amendment right of
members. This the courts can achieve on their own. It would be a contri-
bution to restoring participation to a central role in all our institutions.
In the case of political parties, this development of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence is consistent with taking voting seriously as an ele-
ment of constitutional structure. This development of First Amendment
jurisprudence reconciles associational claims with consent as provided
in the first sentence of the Constitution stating that "we the people ...
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do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America."' 0° Vote negation, whether by a branch of government or by
political party managers, is not part of the concept of consent at the heart
of our Constitution.
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